Rio+20 Portal

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At Rio+20 governments can create a more responsive and representative Multilateral Environmental Network … or enthrone a new Environmental Empire. Three issues:

Green governance

An Earth Grab (the rushed negotiating timetable could lead to…):  Construction of a more centralized, pseudo-UN, ‘green governance’ mechanism, that privileges the private sector and Bretton Woods institutions while disenfranchising much of the global South as it commandeers control over the environment, natural resources (including agriculture) and climate change;

…Or an Earth Agenda (that is participatory and precautionary and…): Creates a new, broad, participatory and transparent UN environmental network within which South governments, and civil society, can address the full range of climate and environmental issues now managed by 500 disparate agreements and institutions; and … welcomes the reformed UN Committee on World Food Security (CFS) as its interlocutor for food, agriculture and rural development policies and programmes;

Green economies

An Earth Grab (the rushed negotiating timetable could lead to…): Implicit entrenchment of a suite of untested, so-called “clean technologies” as the basis for a “Green Economy”(including synthetic biology, nanotechnology, genomics and geoengineering) that will dominate the South’s natural resources (again, agriculture included), and…

…Or an Earth Agenda (that is participatory and precautionary and…): Commits the UN, in 2012 – as a central element in the development of socially, economically and culturally appropriate and diverse green economies – to a negotiating process leading to an international technology assessment and information mechanism that strengthens national sovereignty and technology policy choices;

Climate Change strategies

An Earth Grab (the rushed negotiating timetable could lead to…): Acquiescence to a technology transfer regime (possibly finalized in either Durban or in Rio) that will impose industry’s monopoly control over the deployment of untried technologies— including, especially, geoengineering.

…Or an Earth Agenda (that is participatory and precautionary and…): Asserts the integrity of the multilateral community and the priority of the precautionary principle as being at the core of technology regulation and transfer; and affirms UN control over all technologies intended to impact climate change by establishing a legally-binding prohibition of all forms of geoengineering; including, possibly through the convening of an early meeting of state parties to ENMOD (UN Environmental Modification Treaty, 1978).

The Long (half-century) Road to Rio+20

Rio+20 is, more accurately, Stockholm+40 – or, more philosophically, Silent Spring-50 (2012 being the 50th anniversary of the publication of Rachel Carson’s famous book). The 1972 Stockholm Conference established UNEP and the institutional framework for the UN response to environmental issues and the Rio Earth Summit of 1992 set the global environmental agenda for the 21st century. Rio+20 must review and, then, implement an updated agenda. Some states wish to avoid a review of the original Rio commitments, arguing that Rio+20 must be forward-looking. This is a mistake. Governments must avoid false premises if they are not to be fooled by false promises.

Current governance structures for both the environment and agriculture in the UN system suffer from a lack of coordination among institutions; a lack of effective representation for most governments; and an absence of involvement of civil society and social movements. Rio+20 offers a real opportunity to strengthen democracy and peoples’ participation within the UN system.

Genuinely green economies must be based upon the appropriate use of biodiversity to meet human needs and safeguard planetary systems. Governments and civil society especially welcome the strengthening and formation of diverse, locally-centered, socially, culturally and ecologically appropriate green economies and encourage communities and countries to actively explore this important goal. However, in the absence of careful intergovernmental debate and extensive people’s involvement, the idea that a sustainable “Green Economy” is the means to harness and develop the biological and other natural resources of the global South – supporting its peoples and protecting the planet – could turn into the most massive resource grab in more than 500 years.

Three Initiatives to Counter the New Biomassters

The months ahead are a time of risk and opportunity. The risks, however, are obvious while the opportunities often go unrecognized. We propose three broad initiatives…

1. Governing Green- A New UN Environmental Network

Create a new, broad, participatory and transparent UN environmental network within which South governments and civil society, can address the full range of climate and environmental issues managed by 500 disparate organizations and agreements; and, welcome the reformed UN Committee on World Food Security (CFS) as its interlocutor for food, agricultural and rural development policies and programmes.

The Problem:

Since the Stockholm Conference of 1972, there has been a proliferation of treaties, agreements and institutions, but the money hasn’t matched the meetings and the decisions haven’t been matched with democratic participation. The multilateral system’s environmental response has been incongruously ad hoc and also ad nauseum. Among the indicators…

Democratic deficit: Post-Stockholm (1972), UNEP says there are at least 500 international environment- related conventions – of which 70% are regional. Forty-five of these global deals have 72 members or more. In the 15 years between the Earth Summit and 2007, just 18 of the 45 major environmental agreements convened 540 meetings reaching 5,084 decisions. Extrapolating roughly – and assuming that the other 27 conventions were less active – South governments have been under-resourced to participate in, probably, 1000 major conferences at which, perhaps, 10,000 decisions, important to their national sovereignty, were reached.

Financial deficit: The total funding available for international environmental governance is unknown. Five years ago, UNEP worked with $136.5 million and the UN had another $301 million to manage MEA’s (multilateral environmental agencies) for which it is responsible—a total of $437.5 million out of the UN’s then budget of $1.65 billion – roughly 25%. About the same time, according to the OECD, much less than 2% –$1.85 billion of the $ 111.2 billion bilateral ODA (official development assistance) spending was on identifiable environmental activities. Importantly, UN managed conventions are less expensive than other non-UN “partnership” arrangements. Costs for UN MEAs have risen (roughly) by a factor of 1.2 since the Earth Summit whereas costs for non-UN MEAs has jumped by a factor of 4.7. This is important for governments to remember as they discuss new environmental umbrellas or institutions.

The Response:

While there are dozens of permutations and perturbations, proposals for restructuring the multilateral environmental community boil down to three basic formats:

• 1. UNEP Upgrade: turning the Nairobi-based “program” into a full-membership UN “agency” (à la UNDP, for example) with increased authority, resources and an expanded mandate;
• 2. Environmental Empire: creating a new, post-UN, super-body (possibly either in Paris or Rio) bringing together key UN actors with Bretton Woods institutions, Big Biz and Big Philanthropy in a loose pact or partnership that would marginalize most governments, most treaties/agreements, and most of civil society;
• 3. iPlanet convergence: adding on a few cheap apps to tweak and twitter the existing structures into a more coherent and collaborative configuration and, hopefully, achieve some governance and financial efficiencies and effectiveness.

There is logic to upgrading UNEP and giving it the resources and authority necessary to harmonize the multilateral community’s environmental efforts. All UN member states would have an equal role in the new UNEP and nothing would prevent UNEP from structuring whatever formal or informal arrangements governments wish in order to bring in the voice of non-UN actors (as has been done recently with the UN Committee on World Food Security, discussed later). The only reason, then, to introduce a new Environmental Empire (a.k.a. World Environment Organization) would be to weaken the influence of governments by “Rio-engineering” the kind of informal compact that inevitably benefits those with wealth and power. Still, it will be difficult (impossible?) to get agreement on a UNEP upgrade before Rio. iPlanet’s tweaks and twitters are eminently more doable…and, perhaps, safer.

Rio-engineering of the environmental infrastructure should:

• 1. Assure the universal participation of all member states of the United Nations on the basis of one country – one vote;
• 2. Strengthen the UN’s capacity to support regional and national action;
• 3. Recognize the expertise and special relationship of social movements – especially indigenous, farming and local communities – and other civil society organizations with the environment through new arrangements supporting their full participation;
• 4. Facilitate effective participation by synchronizing and streamlining the number of intergovernmental meetings needed to oversee treaties and agreements;
• 5. Force and facilitate rationalized treaty secretariats – including global and regional offices and operations – to improve coherence and optimize financial management.

Governments and civil society organizations could unite to propose a constructive iPlanet that meets these criteria – a multi-institutional network that combines the best-practices established through the three UN chemicals and wastes conventions (Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm) and the template of the four agricultural agencies within the reformed Committee on World Food Security (CFS) and the proposals for civil society participation (accepted, in 2004, by Sec. Gen. Kofi Annan). These three initiatives together could lead to a very creative, more coordinated – but still responsive and flexible – environmental network.

Chemical attractions: Recently, the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (1989), the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade (1998), and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs, 2001) have begun to merge their secretariats and coordinate meetings of their Governing Bodies to maximize their efficiencies in monitoring hazardous waste and chemicals from cradle to grave. UNEP provides the secretariat for the Basel and Rotterdam conventions and UNEP and FAO jointly staff the Stockholm convention. The three conventions are also looking at the possibility of joint capacity-building and funding mechanisms. Although each convention has its own membership and treaty obligations, the collaboration has, thus far, been constructive.

Family farm: As a second model, following tough external evaluations, beginning in 2009, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), and the World Food Programme (WFP) have begun to coordinate their program and planning during the weeklong annual meeting of the UN/FAO Committee on World Food Security (CFS, 1974). Interestingly, they have been joined by a fourth non-UN multilateral institution: the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). The CFS also has a fledgling High-Level Panel of Experts charged with reporting on critical issues. While the HLPE has potential, it has thus far sidestepped the important work of the IAASTD and has not adequately engaged the smallholder farmers, fishers and pastoralists. This is surprising because, uniquely, CSOs and social movements – especially smallholder farm organizations – have the right to self-organize and participate fully in all aspects of the CFS. The only clear difference between their participation and states is that governments still have the prerogative of voting.

CSO/Freedom of Information: A third interesting initiative is the UN ECE’s 1998 Aarhus Convention (Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters), which proposes the intergovernmental equivalent of national Freedom of Information requests. This is only being implemented in Europe so far. If governments bear in mind the Aarhus recommendations, consider CSO participation in the CFS, and also take into account the recommendations of the Cardoso Panel on CSO participation (2004), these three initiatives make a strong case for a much more inclusive CSO/social movement involvement in a new environmental network.

The new UN environmental network could include the major relevant treaties adopted since 1972 including the UNFCCC, CBD and Desertification conventions. Because of the importance of agriculture (including forestry and fisheries) to the environment, the reformed CFS, while maintaining its independence, should contribute to the new network as appropriate. In the preparatory process leading to Rio, governments could establish a working group within the IFSD (Institutional Framework for Sustainable Development) to develop the new network based upon the above initiatives.

The Importance of Agricultural Governance at Rio+20

In negotiations concerning carbon trading within the UNFCCC and in Rio+20 discussions about a “Green Economy,” there is a worrisome tendency to subsume food and agriculture into a wider corporate “environmental” agenda that tends to ignore the recurring global food crises and the links between industrial agriculture and the climate crisis. There is also a tendency to overlook the importance of the restructured Committee on World Food Security as a key partner in achieving socially and ecologically sustainable development within the framework of Food Sovereignty.

The food crisis that, in 2008, drove more than a billion people into hunger, is back again with some commodity prices now the highest in history. All proposals for new uses for land or biomass must be screened through the on-the-ground experience of smallholder producers and those who are hungry. The environmental or climate change lens is not enough.

The importance of agriculture and, within that, the importance of small producers must be central to any discussions about a new green economy. According to UNEP’s recent report (Toward a Green Economy). There are 525 million small farms of which 404 million have less than two hectares. Small farmers account for 70% (and growing) of global agricultural production. UNEP’s report says that there is substantial evidence that smaller farms have higher yields. 90% of African agricultural production – and 40% of India’s cereal production – comes from small farms. Much of the data used by UNEP and others is disappointingly old – at least 6 to 20 years. In the light of the recurring food crisis, more up-to-date information on the role of smallholder farmers, farm size and productivity will be necessary. In considering global food production, green economists must also know the contribution of artisanal fishers and of hunters and gatherers – the “hidden harvest” that makes up one-third or more of rural caloric consumption in some seasons. Further, green economists must take into account the importance of urban and peri-urban food production, which is sometimes estimated at 25% of urban consumption.

When it is all put together, “peasant” (non-industrial) production may be as high as 80 or 85% of global consumption and is, by far, the most important food source for the 1 billion hungry people who can’t afford to shop at Carrefour or Wal-Mart.

At Rio+20, governments must recognize the CFS as its interlocutor on food and agricultural issues, and acknowledge the vital importance of small food producers, which are responsible for the majority of world’s food supply. Further, governments should acknowledge that the starting point for the development of agricultural strategies must be the Report of the International Assessment on Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD) and, especially, its emphasis on the role of smallholder producers in achieving sustainable food sovereignty.

2. Green Economy? – First, Technology Assessment

Commit the UN, in 2012 – as a central element in the development of socially, economically and culturally appropriate and diverse green economies – to a negotiating process leading to an international technology assessment and information mechanism that strengthens national sovereignty and technology policy choices.

The Problem:

Transfer… or Dump? Technology transfer issues will figure large at COP 17 of the UNFCCC in Durban late in 2011. Many governments see access to new technologies as vital to their ability to respond to climate change and are anxious to ensure that intellectual property regimes and licensing arrangements don’t make the technologies prohibitively expensive. Likewise, industry and some OECD states are keen to protect their intellectual property. Industrialized countries will inevitably argue that any IP concessions (reduced royalty payments, etc.) should be counted as part of their financial contribution. As it was at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, technology will also be important at Rio+20. In the scramble for access, some governments are not asking if the technologies they want are safe, useful, or have strings attached. Since Copenhagen, the USA has blocked any intellectual property discussion signaling that it will be monopoly-as-usual post-Rio.

Nanotechnology, synthetic biology, meta-genomics and geoengineering are not discreet inventions but technology platforms that demand whole production and/or processing systems. They are also untested and their suitability to national needs is speculative. The global South – which is receiving the brunt of environmental deterioration and climate change – will also be the guinea pig for testing these powerful technological packages.

The logical prerequisite to technology transfer is the creation, by the United Nations, of a technology assessment and information mechanism.

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