WHO GOVERNS THE WORLD?

Social Movement and World Governance

For a democratic cosmopolitarian movement

Jean Rossiaud
November 2012

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"And here we can feel that we are approaching a significant revolution (so significant that it may not take place), the revolution relating to the great paradigm of Western science (and, consequentially, of metaphysics, sometimes the negative image of science, sometimes its counterpart) […].

That which affects a paradigm, that is to say, the cornerstone of an entire system of thought, also affects ontology, methodology, epistemology, logic and, hence, practices, society and politics."

Edgar Morin

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Foreword: learning from Rio+20

The Rio+20 Conference was neither a success nor a failure. We simply need to see it for what it was and not as what we would have wished it to be.

Let us see it as a snapshot of the current power structures in place, both in terms of global thinking and global action, namely, at a planetary level.

Firstly, it is worth remembering that the Rio conference was not part of the *international* strategy espoused by world powers. In June 2012, states' immediate concerns and issues were altogether different. We must recognize this.

The Rio+20 Conference was part of the process led by UN programmes and agencies, which periodically provide an overview of the *world* situation, in this case on the environment: after Stockholm in 1972 and Rio in 1992, there had to be a Rio+20 conference in 2012.

Neither the United States, nor Europe, nor the so-called emerging countries incorporated into G20 wanted this conference at that precise moment. Having already seen the evidence in December 2009 in Copenhagen, they knew that the conditions for international negotiations between states were not favourable for reaching the slightest agreement.

The world will wait; disaster and chaos may not.

Despite this, the UN got its conference and that in itself was something. The primary outcome was the global-scale mobilization of national and transnational civil society, public opinion, academia and state and UN officials. Side effects were an immense sense of frustration and the feeling that this was a fool's game, a show without an actor.

And yet awareness is growing. It took 40 years for the findings and forecasts of a minority of ecologists (who were considered ludicrously alarmist at the time) to be taken up by the vast majority of the media and politicians. No one—or almost no one—denies the harsh reality of global warming, the extremely harmful loss of biodiversity and the non-sustainability of the system of production and consumption at a global level.

But the system is stuck. The key players are still endlessly reading from a script that is no longer relevant, either in terms of thought or action. Not to mention the vacuity of the concept of a green economy.

And even if we have never been as close as we are now to the *momentum* needed for a paradigm shift to find a way out of the ecological and social crisis, there is currently nothing to say that we will not let the opportunity pass us by.

To resolve the impasse, a *dual change of perspective* is required: a change in the field of thought and a change in the field of social and political action. We therefore have to enter into two phases of transition simultaneously and link up these two transitions.

The aim of this paper may appear utopian and overly ambitious to some. That is because it is not limited to thinking about the world using existing concepts, and because it is positioned resolutely within a particularly high level of social action, at the universal and world level of humanity.

Indeed, I have chosen to situate my theory in a sufficiently long time period to encompass at least the modern era, in a sufficiently wide geographic area to include the planet, and in a sufficiently broad strand of sociology to account for humanity in its universality.

Answering the question of the century

I have chosen to consider **humanity** as an **historical subject** that is struggling to emerge at a key moment in political modernity, when *democracy*, weakened at all levels, is *inexistent* at the only level where the key issues of humanity are discussed today—that of the world system.

The world ecological crisis and the inability of the international system of states to respond to it demonstrate that the human condition is now universal; more so than ever before. It is driving humanity (known as "the human race" or "humankind") to think of itself today as a world community, to form itself into a world society and, like a world nation, collectively to defend its survival and its future.

Humanity is already struggling to see itself as a world community. Consciousness of sharing a common destiny on a global level is not yet very widespread. Moreover, only the creation of a form of *global political power*—whatever form it might take— could constitute a world society. In Switzerland, it is the Federal Constitution that created the sense of being Swiss; and it is the European Union that is today creating European identity.

However, neither the international system, the contemporary UN system, based on bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, nor the G8 and G20 have proven capable

of constituting the minimum institutional structure to allow the implementation of *world governance*.

The issue is that effective world governance is now indispensable for the survival of humanity on earth, not to mention humankind's aspirations for liberty, equality and solidarity or their desire for emancipation.

How can world governance be put into effect? That, in my view, is **the issue of the century**, the question we have to undertake to answer. And there is some urgency. Yet we still do not have the theoretical tools to do so, nor *a fortiori* the social and political forces necessary to establish the conditions for this governance.

A new paradigm of thought for a new paradigm of action

When we rely on a new theory to develop a new strategy for action, the first difficulty with which we are confronted—and also the most significant—is that we are forced to forge new concepts. This is because the concepts we have in our toolbox of ideas are either so worn out that they have to be completely rebuilt, or totally hackneyed and obsolete, and therefore unqualified to describe and understand the new issue and make it understood. A new paradigm of thought and action therefore requires new concepts.

This paper is an attempt to set out new sociological concepts by suggesting a number of neologisms, with the aim of addressing the questions that follow.

Question one: how should we define the difference between the current world and previous worlds?

Since its emergence five or six centuries ago, modernity has always cultivated a world system process, i.e. the dialectic between globalization and (re)location. However, in the 1990s, following two World Wars and the Cold War, humanity experienced a huge acceleration in the world system process, made especially possible by the advent of new information and communications technologies.

The consequence of the considerable expansion in digital communications has been to reinforce, among increasingly large sections of the world population, the sense of belonging to a unique (though very diverse) human community advancing towards the same destiny. Although it has not yet been widely analyzed or understood, this phenomenon marks a real epistemic break in the history of humanity.

At the same time, where *first modernity* allowed the expression of *a limitless desire for emancipation* both collectively and individually, then *second modernity*[1], whilst also incorporating the desire for emancipation, puts it within *the limits of sustainability*.

1. Owing to lack of space, I will not here explain the theory of modernity (or the modern world system) on which I have based my concept of *moNdernization*. It is not the subject of this paper.

MoNdernity is the name I have given[2] to the modern world system in its contemporary formal structure, and **moNdernization** is the continual world system process at work within modernity and inherent to the modern world system. *MoNdernity* and *moNdernization* constitute the world system that corresponds to second modernity, which notably places the desire for individual and collective emancipation within the limits of sustainability.

Question two: how should we define the political format that will facilitate world governance?

Like ethnic or national communities, the world community, i.e. humanity that is conscious of sharing a common destiny at a global level, cannot become an historic subject (subject of its own history on the planet) without creating legitimate political institutions at a global level. Above all, it needs to create an *institution of these institutions*[3] that would serve as the cornerstone of *moNdernity* by guaranteeing the coherence of the world political structure and regulation of its governance.

World State *is the name I have given to the form of global political power that will allow the implementation of world governance*.

The idea of a World State can be frightening if it is viewed as opening the door to a totalitarian Leviathan.

However, it can also be viewed as a simple confederation, based on the principle of active subsidiarity, or a federation of continental federations, or even a third type of international organization (following on from the League of Nations and UN), for which existing international organizations and specialist agencies would form world ministries. Or a mixture of these forms of political organization.

However, when we really think about it, it is the current lack of World State that is terrifying, because there is no systemic regulation, and *a fortiori* no democratic check that is today able to oppose either imperialist *oppression*, the relentless economic *exploitation* of resources and populations by multinationals and mafias or the cultural *hegemony* of the waste and consumption society at the actual level where this oppression, exploitation and hegemony exist—the world level.

The lack of World State limits social movements to resistance, a repertoire of defensive or reactive actions, at the local or national level. Social movements can therefore only express what stems from their "dark side"[4].

The light side of social movements, which would be expressed by positive, offensive, proactive actions and by promoting collective interests or values created by and within democratic debate, and which would introduce movements' demands into

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the political sphere, cannot emerge for one simple reason: today, problems are resolved at a world level and no longer at the national or local level. This helps increase the sense of frustration, powerlessness and cynicism among social actors and the population as a whole, whilst discrediting existing policies because they cannot impose their power or negotiate political or economic options that are, at the end of the day, outside their remit.

However, about a dozen years ago, a new and different type of world social movement was created, using a positive form of expression corresponding to the light side of social movements: the alter-globalization movement.

It can mainly be seen within the context of World Social Forums (WSF) or at parallel events organized during the major UN summits. Although we can currently consider it to be *the biggest social movement of all time*, it remains totally powerless to exert any significant influence on the world order, because it cannot find a counterpart on the level where the balance of power operates—the world level.

Question three: how should we define the movement that would provide a democratic check on world governance?

It is therefore time to call for the creation of a world democratic movement, which could work to create a constitutional state at the effective level: the world level.

Democratic cosmopolitarian movement *is the name I have given to the world social movement whose chief demand will be the creation of a World State, following the example of the nationalitarian movements, born out of first modernity, that demanded the creation of nation states in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries, in order to transcend the feudalism and localism that prevented the progression of social and political aspirations for individuals and peoples.*

The democratic cosmopolitarian movement, taking the ideological progress of the anti-globalization movement (see below) as a starting point, drawing on a repertoire of both alter-globalization and anti-globalization actions and broadening its social base to include social stakeholders frustrated by current obstructions (representatives of small states or international institutions), would be more of a political (meta-ideological) than social movement in the strictest sense. Its historic goal would be to create the political conditions for the reorganization of social forces, and therefore the emergence of new social movements within a framework that is both more global and more democratic.

The democratic cosmopolitarian movement would therefore probably disappear by itself once a World State had been created, just as the nationalitarian movements disappeared once the states they had demanded were established.

In reality, the democratic World State that would emerge under the pressure of the democratic cosmopolitarian movement would not establish a peaceful world society; far from it. It would not make oppression, exploitation or hegemony disappear from local to global levels. But it would finally once again make it possible to reorganize collective action at the right levels of governance. It would be a much more effective context for opposing social forces to express themselves and voice their ideologies and politics.

The World State would also once again legitimize both the world political system[5] at all levels—from local to global—and the many forms that its debates take, also at all levels.

The World State, arbitrator and guide, would be liable for world governance (the form that this would take would be debated democratically), its role based on dialogue and negotiation with *international civil society* organizations and by being challenged by *world social movements* on the fundamental societal directions taken in the name of the people and citizens of the world.

A World State would therefore mean that *social and political collective action could take on new meaning*, since it would take place within an institutional framework.

The concept espoused by early political ecology, "think globally, act locally", is no longer enough; from now on, we must also "think locally and *act globally*". And we therefore need to explore world governance.

Talking about governance means talking about politics. And talking about world governance means that we have to talk about *world politics*. Which brings us to the black hole of contemporary political thought, because there is no real debate about world politics among political parties.

Political parties—irrespective of their ideological orientation—shape their positions and programmes at all the political and institutional levels where they operate. They know how to address the local (or metropolitan) level, the level of relations between the central state and the regions (or federal states) and the level of relations between states, or even regional integration (European Union, Mercosur, ASEAN, African Union, etc.). But beyond that—nothing! The ideological discourse of political parties, civil society organizations or even transnational social movements does not raise the question of world governance as such.

Champions of sustainable development at the UN or in non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have remained blocked at an *international* level. They have not succeeded in switching to a *global level of governance*, nor even a concept

of governance that is truly on a *world level* (that is to say, which recognizes the continual dialectic between the global and the local, allowing active subsidiarity and popular sovereignty at all levels of politics). In short, no one today has a democratic and multi-level vision of world governance, let alone a political programme for implementing it.

Towards a cosmopolitarian movement to build a world political structure

Forty years after Stockholm and the first Earth Summit, participants in the Rio+20 Conference stated, with tragic naivety, that we are very clearly in a state of emergency as regards saving humanity from disaster. Even the extreme pessimists of the 1970s could not have imagined the catastrophic state—partially irreversible—in which the planet finds itself today.

Over the past twenty years, increasing numbers of individuals have acknowledged that they belong to *one* world community. In *Homeland Earth*, Edgar Morin touches on the emergence of this new consciousness. We are all in the same boat, and now we know it. It is inescapable.

It is up to national and transnational civil societies to demand the switch to the world level. Like the nationalitarian movements of the 18th and 19th centuries, or the national liberation movements of the 20th century, the world social movement (from the Porto Alegre WSF to the Rio+20 Peoples' Summit) needs to transform itself into a world political movement—a *cosmopolitarian* movement demanding a world political system.

It is time to establish a broad political movement at a world level in a position to demand that large political groups, whatever their ideology, create a sort of World Constituent Assembly that would transform and democratize the UN and the multilateral and international system.

A world system capable of ensuring our planet's sustainability while encompassing social and human development, preserving biodiversity and eradicating extreme poverty.

Unless this new political system, truly a world system, is put in place, rather than a merely international system (the Swiss know how to differentiate between federal and inter-cantonal levels), there is good reason to fear that the significant threat of global social and ecological catastrophe will become a reality. Such a system is necessary, but no one can tell if it will be sufficient.

This paper therefore aims to show that a world community, that is, humanity that has the sense of sharing a common destiny at a global level, cannot come into being without the creation of some form of world political power: a sort of World State.

I have therefore chosen to provide a more detailed description of the global social movement that I have observed in my capacity as a sociologist and taken part in as an activist for over twenty-five years. We are not starting from scratch. Various social processes linked to the world system process have been underway, and have if anything speeded up, for a quarter of a century.

The new social movements that emerged post-1968 and the anti-globalization and alter-globalization movements that followed have been converging for about twenty years around demands that, inescapably, have led to raising the question of creating a World State in which social and political forces would redeploy their struggles.

It is this *democratic cosmopolitarian movement* in the making that must demand the creation of a democratic World State.

1. Analysis

Introduction

The transition from modernization to moNdernization

This paper was initially going to be called "Social movements and world governance", but this title overlooked one of the most critical challenges of the period: global mobilization *for* democratic world governance. That is to say, it overlooked the fundamentally *political* aspect of contemporary social mobilization.

Since the mid-1980s, the new social movements resulting from the post-1968 struggles (feminism, the Third World movement, environmentalism, urban and neo-rural campaigns, anti-nuclear and human rights movements, etc.) have together been contributing to a powerful *process of democratization*. Each following its own logic, they have therefore participated in the redefinition of citizenship, as much on the *spatial* level (from the most local level to the world level) as on the *social* level (from the most individual and private *social* level to the human race in its entirety and its unity). The focal point has been the development of three generations of human rights: civil and political rights, economic, social and cultural rights and the rights of future generations.

The fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Cold War and explosion of information and communications technologies that followed in its wake, the formal democratization of Latin America and central and eastern Europe and then Africa, the opening up of China, the UN Summits (and counter-summits), the G8 and G20, Davos and Porto Alegre forums and the world crises are all phenomena that have contributed, in one way or another, to the acceleration of the globalization process and to aggravating the crisis of legitimacy afflicting political powers, limited by the borders of their respective states.

But even though the world outlook is increasingly becoming an empirical fact, there

is today no such thing as the sense of belonging to a global civilizational space. *A fortiori,* the human race that inhabits the planet does not currently govern itself according to the principles of humanity and responsibility, either individual or collective. And it is guided even less by modern and democratic values of respect for plurality and the promotion of worldwide solidarity.

Even if the *human condition* seems to be a given, as much from a biological as an anthropo-social point of view, *the human race* does not yet perceive itself as a community, either in its unity or in its capacity to be a subject of its future. The majority of humans do not yet feel conscious of sharing a common destiny; they cannot therefore collectively express a common will to live in safety and harmony on planet earth, nor to choose political representatives whose political programme would ensure this safety and harmony, or even to defend the values of liberty, equality and solidarity (the DNA of modern political ideology) on a planet-wide scale, from the local to global level.

To put it another way, the concept of the nation, as a common fate, a collective subjectivity that transcends individuals, classes and ethnicity, does not yet have a world equivalent. And even though it has been emerging for two or three decades, for those who know where to look for it, this world nation, this humanity made community, still remains to be built.

We have also seen a globalization of social movements and the emergence of a transnational civil society, which has certainly been strengthened over the same period.

This phenomenon is far from insignificant. If we look back 25 years, in the mid-1980s transnational civil society clearly did not exist, either from an empirical or from a theoretical perspective. Barely a quarter of a century later, there are now a number of civil society organizations that have realized that together they form a transnational civil society. This embryonic form of collective organization, born at the end of the Cold War, continues to build up by means of three processes: spreading

geographically across the planet, becoming more universal (i.e. defending the interests and values of ever greater sections of the population, for example, the Dalits, indigenous peoples and future generations) and grouping together areas of mobilization that were previously unconnected while creating ideological ties between them.

This process is, of course, far from being complete. For example, there are still vast areas of the world, such as China, Russia and central Asia, that remain on the margins of this phenomenon. And even in Europe and Latin America, where the concept of civil society re-emerged in the mid-1980s, there are many places where transnational civil society simply does not exist.

This transnational civil society and the organizations it comprises today find themselves confronted by a contemporary international system that excludes any democratic engagement with humanity's major challenges (particularly climate change, waste of resources, collective safety and guaranteeing the rights of individuals and minority groups), either on a local or national level or, *a fortiori*, on a continental or world level. Major disasters, pollution, financial and economic crises and people, drugs and arms trafficking all transcend national borders.

The fact that demands for change and social and political demands can never be addressed at the relevant level, where the issues operate, is the cause of much alarm among citizens and civil society organizations.

The state, as the collection of different *institutional regulations* and *political powers* within a territory (the constitutional state in democratic systems), is the expression by the government of the *collective will* of the community, nation or sovereign people (also called the collective subjectivity of the people) in that territory.

But today, the states themselves, when faced with issues that cannot in fact be dealt with except at a higher level (continental or global), can no longer play their role, whereby they provide a *double* mirror, for civil society on the one hand *and* for social movements on the other. On the one hand, nation states no longer allow civil society organizations to defend their interests and values within a regulatory framework (mirroring the state as the institution of institutions). On the other hand, social movements can no longer challenge the state in its function as leader of the sovereign people or the national community

and position themselves as an alternative, suggesting other strategic directions or another method of development, because the problems and solutions are dealt with at a higher level.

The world political system founded on the sovereignty of nation states no longer works; and, as there is no *World State*, whole areas of politics elude democratic citizenship, both in its expression via civil society organizations and in the expression of new social directions demanded by social movements.

The last two or three decades has seen an accelerated implementation of the outlines of institutional regulations (ILO, WTO, IMF) and supranational powers (UN Security Council, G8, G20) at a global level. This is the emergence of a new type of political format. It is not the same as the *international system of states*, born out of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, in which we still live, and which considers each nation state as an individual equal to others in the international community; and neither does it correspond to a *world government* as such, which would allow the human community to become a society.

Today, world politics lie between these two poles. But, as it is accountable neither to existing states nor to a non-existing World State, this draft form of world governance is anything but democratic. Either it is simply a by-product of the system, or it is the doing of a handful of heads of state and of large transnational companies. In both cases, the power it has is beyond citizen control.

Today, social movements and transnational civil society need one World State in order to pursue their mission of democratization, initiated with the emergence of modernity over two centuries ago, seeking greater liberty, equality and solidarity and driven by the need for emancipation and, more recently, sustainability.

The trade union movement emerged within the nation states once they had been formed, its specific form depending on the type of nation state within which it waged its social and political battles. Whereas the need for internationalism has been recognized ideologically since the birth of the nation state by political parties claiming to represent the trade union movement, internationalism has never managed to resolve political issues at the level where capitalists organized the defence of their interests. Moreover, the notion of *internationalism* denoted the fact that the nation

6. This has been well demonstrated by Immauel Wallerstein.

state remained impassable and constituted an epistemic, ideological and social barrier. Lastly, the social sciences, political ideologies and civil society organizations have spent two centuries confined in the straitjacket imposed by the nation state[6].

Today, the goal of a democratic cosmopolitarian movement must be to break down this barrier in order to free social forces, as was the case with the democratic nationalitarian movement in past centuries.

As we have seen, a World State will allow collective action to be redeployed at the right levels of governance, and will make political systems operative once again, from local to global levels, by permitting the organization—at the right level of legitimacy—of the many forms of social protest.

A World State is necessary precisely because it will be *the object of protest f*or civil society organizations, social movements and political parties, from the most global to the most local level of social and political action.

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The creation of a *modern world system* over the last two or three centuries has been the biggest anthropo-sociological change known to humankind—at least since the move from hunting, gathering and nomadism to farming, livestock breeding and a sedentary lifestyle.

We are currently seeing the end of first modernity, which is drawing to a close with a series of systemic crises. The states that were the driving forces behind the process of modernization in their respective countries are no longer in a position to carry out this function.

In the wake of the English Civil War and American Revolution, 1789 represented the political emancipation of traditional communities and enabled the consolidation of modern ideology—liberty, equality, solidarity—and its spread across the world, sometimes at the cost of the most brutal colonialism or imperialism.

By opening up technology (ICT), globalizing the economy and its crises and freeing science, ideologies and social movements from their national borders, 1989 served to speed up both the process of modernization and globalization.

The modern world system is now coming to the end of a phase of *globalization*, since it now covers the whole world, and of *civilizational homogenization*, as human rights and responsibilities form its ethical and standard-setting underpinning. The fact that the economic system has reached the physical limits of its own propagation drives the need for *political regulation of ecological and anthropo-social systems* at a world level.

Only the political sphere—the state—has so far failed to follow this movement. This regulation is now all that is lacking in order for *moNdernity* to express its full human and social potential. A second modernity is now in its embryonic stages. This world system is *moNdernity.* And *moNdernization* will pursue, extend and reinforce the process set in motion by modernity.

We are currently in a period of transition.

This period of transition, where the old is disappearing and the new being formed, is marked by a succession of uncertainties: no human community has ever survived without political regulation. Leaving unbridled *technology* to pursue its own path of innovation and rationalization—the unending quest for innovation and better performance—means allowing humanity to be held hostage by those who choose to play with fire. Leaving the *economy,* unchecked and without a redistribution mechanism, to pursue its own path of exploiting resources and maximizing ever greater profit means leaving humanity in the hands of the exploiters and the powerful. Leaving civil society organizations and social movements to work on defending interest groups and values as well as developing social and political demands strictly within the local framework laid down by nation states not only means over-valuing localism and communitarianism, it also, and especially, means emptying the democratization and emancipation process of its content and leaving the fight for power in the hands of those who own capital (acquired more or less legally) and millenarian ideologists.

The challenge facing us today is thus essentially political. And regulation on the world level, with a World State, has become a condition governing the survival of local and national civil society and social movements that, working on every continent, implement the fundamental achievement of modernity: the expression of *collective subjectivity*, a "we" that recognizes its status as a collective subject.

Clearly, this collective subjectivity is not present in the same form everywhere. It is fragile and constantly challenged. But if we place any value in the process of development over time, it is certainly greater in quantity and quality than a hundred or fifty, or even ten or twenty years ago.

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Numerous examples, such as the fact that there is greater awareness of Fukushima (March 2011) than Chernobyl (April 1986), that the G20 had greater media impact than the G7, that there is greater awareness of the global financial crisis, with the subprime and sovereign debt crises, than the 1929 crisis, which was analyzed after the event, all show us that "we, humanity" are stronger and more universal than in previous centuries and decades, and this trend is not faltering—quite the opposite.

This "we" is rooted in the defence of shared interests and values, which bring with them our awareness of belonging to the same condition (we share a common destiny, forming a being-*in-itself*) and that *we* can collectively mobilize to defend the interests and values that we share (we form a *being-for-itself*).

The expression of these collective subjectivities is truncated in the current era of *transition* between modernity and *moNdernity*, since the bedrock of these collective subjectivities, the feeling of belonging to the world community, is now failing.

However, most importantly, if we do not forcefully lay claim to it today, it really does run the risk of being discounted in the next modern world system, as a form of planet-wide political regulation takes shape that excludes all collective choice and democratic control.

If we look at the current situation and the likely developments over the next ten or twenty years, there is not much room for optimism. In the light of the current balance of power at the world level and the economic and strategic factors at stake in the control of natural resources on the planetary level, there is a great risk of rifts and confrontations, possibly militarized. The political world system process could thus experience periods where it breaks down.

The primary purpose in the formation of a democratic cosmopolitarian movement should be to prevent a third World War. The trade union movement and Socialist International failed in this task in 1914. And even though the two World Wars, as well as the Cold War, did finally speed up the world system process, they did so at the cost of so much destruction and so much suffering that the need for transnational society to evolve into a cosmopolitarian movement is now more urgent than ever. If the cosmopolitarian movement can be the agent for a gentle transition, it has the moral duty to do so.

The political structures and forms of government that will be established during this cur-rent period of transition will probably leave a powerful mark on the structures and forms that will crystallize in the new world system. Which is why it is so important for democrats to *act now to defend a democratic form of the World State*, in other words, a state that guarantees the rule of law and the implementation of open, multi-level governance founded on the principles of active subsidiarity.

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The paradigm shift that will take us from modernity to *moNdernity* will also produce a leap forward in complexity for humanity, particularly in its relationship with the biosphere and the universe.

Like Edgar Morin, I am convinced that a new paradigm is currently materializing, totally transforming *not only* the *sciences* (human and social sciences, following on from chemical physics and the life sciences), *but also the entire symbolic universe* that we have shared since the emergence of modernity and that gives meaning to the slightest of our daily activities: it encompasses not only a new cosmogony, but also a new conception of humans' place in the universe and on the planet and of our relationship to life in all its unity and diversity, to other living beings, particularly animals, to humanity as a species, to past and future generations and, lastly, to the groups, communities and societies that form humanity, as the infinite alterity of each individual is taken into consideration.

Switching from first to second modernity: subjecting development to sustainability

The concept of sustainable development that began to take root in people's minds and in law, in 1987 with the Brundtland Report and 1992 with the Rio Earth Summit and launch of Agenda 21, has been of theoretical and practical use. It is the fruit of an historic compromise between the Third World movement (development-centric and internationalist) and the environmental movement (centred on conservation and localism).

In the post-Cold War world, it gave shape both to UN internationalism (a single world) and anti- and alter-globalization ("another world is possible"). Thanks to the concept of sustainable development, there now exists a consensus on the serious nature of the ecological and social crisis, its global scale and the fact that it is the product of the prevailing mode of economic development: it marked the beginning of a paradigm shift.

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For, although it accomplished its ideological mission, sustainable development did not succeed in its practical mission: preventing the world drawing nearer disaster as the world system process accelerated.

If we want to find a way out of this predicament and the answer to the equation so vital to humanity—how to survive in unity—now is the time to let go of the notion of sustainable development.

The ideas linked to sustainable development have failed because they were rooted in the continuity rather than discontinuity of the modern ideology of progress. This kept it anchored in the first modernity. In effect, reaching consensus depended on not questioning the central principle of economic development: growth of production based on increased consumption of resources.

In addition, nothing was done to organize the three dimensions of sustainable development within a unique and coherent model of society: the economic (i.e. the market *for* growth), the social (the fight against destitution, poverty and inequalities) and the environmental (protecting biodiversity, the fight against pollution and global warming).

And most importantly, there was never any discussion—and therefore no agreement—on the adoption of an organizing principle between the two elements that make up the expression "sustainable development." On the global level, the economic dimension is in the hands of the IMF, World Bank, WTO (inside the system) and multinationals, financial markets and mafias (outside the system). The environmental and social dimensions are in an impossible position. The UNEP is not in touch with the UNDP and even further removed from the World Bank, which is meant to finance development (which is in turn meant to be sustainable).

An even more serious problem is that the notion of sustainability has never really been defined, and development, primarily understood as economic growth, has continued to be seen as the necessary reference framework encompassing the conception of sustainability.

Thus, as during the past two centuries and the establishment of first modernity, the principle of boundlessness (the absence of restrictions or restraints) has become endowed with a hierarchically superior value (in the sense given by Louis Dumont) than the principle of limitation (of the planet's ecosystem, *sustainability*, finiteness).

Everything was possible in the epistemic paradigm of first modernity. And yet, there is growing awareness that this is no longer the case.

In the final years of the first modernity—over the last twenty years—the notion of development was tasked with incorporating the notion of sustainability. In practical terms, this mission failed. And we are heading straight for an ecological and social disaster.

The new epistemic paradigm that is taking us into a second modernity should overthrow the hierarchical relationship. In other words, it means that the notion of sustainability will now have to act as the reference framework containing the notion of development.

Up until now, humanity has developed the potential of planet earth to its limits. We are reaching the cut-off point, when humanity will have to change direction and embrace a paradigm shift where the planet's physical limits will take precedence over sustainable development in the form of its economic, social and environmental dimensions.

This may appear simple, but it is far from being so: sustainable development in the form of its three dimensions needs to be forced to use no more resources and raw materials annually than the earth can produce in one year.

We are currently using the equivalent of four to six planets' worth of production.

While we continue to think in terms of sustainable development, we are positioning the need for development as a given (without defining the type of development). We then try to attain this imaginary level of development while promising to think about sustainability for future generations.

If, on the other hand, we give priority to sustainability, we take onboard the fact that the earth has its limits, we decide to remain within these limits and, using them as our framework, we seek to attain the best possible human development and fair distribution of worldwide resources between the planet's inhabitants.

The major challenge facing us is no longer "what sort of sustainable development does human society need?" (a highly anthropocentric position); rather, today's challenge is "what sort of planetary sustainability should we adopt to develop social and human well-being" (a geocentric view).

The difference may seem negligible, but the fact is that this represents the overthrow of the current paradigm—which is no mean feat.

This opportunity to lay down a new paradigm was thrown away in Copenhagen in December 2009 and at the Rio+20 summit in June 2012, as the agenda wandered off in the direction of even less well defined notions such as the green economy. No start was made on the ideological transition.

As part of the transition to this new paradigm, new morals and new ethics, in other words, new collective and individual normative positions, are emerging. They translate this new concept of humans and their relationship to matter, life and their own humanity into the social and political norms that are vital for all collective action; in other words, all human activity.

This new civilizational culture is now being driven by a broad social movement, the democratic cosmopolitarian movement that, *without really being aware of it*, is transmitting the virtuality of the demand for democratic world governance rooted in sustainability. But how has this movement taken form over recent decades? This is the question I am now going to try and answer.

The outlines of the democratic cosmopolitarian movement

The emergence of a new social movement

Since the end of the Cold War, a number of social actors have observed that a new form of world governance has been emerging and begun to organize theme-based networks and social forums on a transnational basis.

From a personal point of view, I have been lucky enough to be able to build up an extensive and diverse experience of international actions and summits and counter-summits on specific themes that I attended as a sociologist and political and community activist.

I thus witnessed, with great interest, the emergence of East-West dialogue in Europe in the late 1980s, between pacifists from the West and dissidents from the East. I then took part in the 1990 founding of the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly, and in its Assemblies in Prague (1990), Bratislava (1992), Ankara (1994) and Tuzla (1995). I have been associated with the Zapatista movement from the first La Realidad Intergalactic Assembly (in Chiapas, Mexico) in 1997 to the first worldwide demonstration against the WTO when it replaced GATT in Geneva in 1998. I took part in the World Social Forums in Porto Alegre (2001, 2002, 2003 and 2005), Mumbai (2004), Caracas (2006), Nairobi

(2007), Belem (2009) and Dakar (2011), as well as the Copenhagen Climate Forum in 2009. I have also attended almost all the European Greens councils and conferences, twice a year since 2003, and the last two Global Greens conferences (Sao Paulo, 2008 and Dakar, 2012). In a professional capacity, I took part in the 2nd and 3rd world conferences held by United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), the biggest network of cities in the world, in Jeju, Korea, in 2007 and Mexico in 2010.

Below I will be providing a theoretical analysis of these experiences.

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In the modern world, politics are sustained by ethics, if we define the latter as the extent to which one distances oneself personally from a moral norm: the *dissident* is one of the emblematic figures here, as is the *social movement*. Both are subjects of history that, one individually, the other collectively, oppose the government with "its" rights and "its" ethics. They do so by reclaiming the very foundations of prevailing rights and ethics, taking them at face value, and organizing them differently, in line with an alternative paradigm. Both contest the directions the state government proposes to the people or the sovereign nation as a collective development. Both take those holding political power at their word and demand the implementation of the ethics and rights these political actors claim to want, in the name of liberty, equality and solidarity.

This ongoing convergence between individual dissidence and social movements, observable at the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly as well as the World Social Forums, means that we can consider the new forms of social and political mobilization that surfaced in the post-1989 period as emblematic of the emerging democratic cosmopolitarian movement[7].

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On 7 December 1999, unusually large-scale demonstrations disturbed the 3rd WTO ministerial conference in Seattle, contributing to its failure. For many observers, for the media, for a large proportion of public opinion, this irruption of radical youth into the public space was unexpected and unpredictable, a spontaneous act with no future. The focus was on the heterogeneous and conflicting nature of this coalition of opposition to neoliberal globalization and it was considered a passing fad likely to result in violent excesses and a wave of repression.

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7. See Jean Roussiaud *Mouvement Social et Etat dans la mondialisation* [*Social Movements and State within the World System Process*] (1996).

Immediate analyses were undoubtedly lacking in historical depth. They almost always overlooked the deep-reaching roots of these mobilizations, the painstaking work undertaken throughout the world by hundreds and thousands of NGOs, not-for-profit organizations and popular movements. They had been coordinating themselves for ten years previously, i.e. since the end of the Cold War, into local networks, national groupings and transnational networks, particularly via counter-summits organized on the margins of international summits. Furthermore, the analysts were mistaken in their assessments of the interweaving of parallel strategies, which encouraged the emergence of this new type of social movement rather than dividing it.

In a phenomenon hard to discern without in-depth theoretical and practical knowledge of mobilization networks and their social roots, two types of mobilization were intersecting and enriching a fast-expanding movement.

Globalization & Anti-globalization

The first point is that, since the anti-WTO demonstration in Geneva (May 1998) and Seattle (December 1999), mobilizations have been growing in scope and structure. Some of them, like the anti-G8 demonstration in Genoa (July 2001), resulted in clashes between the police and demonstrators and a major crackdown, which in Genoa ended in the death of a young activist, and in Copenhagen with the arrest of dozens of demonstrators and demonstration organizers who were held in custody for a protracted period of time.

Moreover, the 11 September 2001 attacks and the unilateral and hegemonic response the USA opted for marked a circumstantial fork in the path of the modern world system and its development, without, however, resulting in any change of direction. For the movements opposing neoliberal globalization and the new world order extolled by George Bush Snr. in the wake of the Cold War, 11 September 2001 also marked a decisive turning point, particularly with the powerful anti-war movement it triggered and the first *world demonstrations* that it organized, held simultaneously in hundreds of cities across the world.

Seattle, Davos, Genoa, then the series of anti-war demonstrations, notably on 15 February 2003—the largest demonstration ever, which did not however avert the war—are key moments in an anti-globalization mobilization that has been almost continuous, as illustrated by the demonstrations held in Geneva, Washington, Bangkok, Goteborg, Prague, Nice, Quebec, Davos and Copenhagen, to name just the main events. Occurring with increasing frequency, they mark an underground mobilization that is putting in place its ideological structure and strategic organization at events ranging from action meetings to counter-summits.

It is true that the global financial crisis that struck in 2008, first with the *subprime* crisis then the public debt crisis, seems to have channelled the demands of social protest movements towards a national rather than an international framework. Nonetheless, on the international level, the non-violent direct action *Occupy* movement, rooted in indignation and passive resistance, has taken over from the violent clashes at demonstrations against meetings of the G8, IMF, World Bank and WTO. But here again, we are probably seeing a short-term expression of a long-term structural transformation process whose direction does not seem to be affected by these new manifestations.

Globalization & Alter-globalization

In parallel to these anti-globalization mobilizations, January 2001 saw the organization of a counterpoint to the World Economic Forum at Davos (barricaded against demonstrators) in the form of the World Social Forum at Porto Alegre, generating a huge amount of political enthusiasm, and marking the beginning of a mobilization based on offering propositions rather than merely opposing neoliberal globalization.

Alternatives to hegemonic thought (networks of alter-globalization ideas and social practices) were being formed and, with them, public awareness than *another world is possible*, a "world where many worlds fit," to borrow the expression Subcomandante Marcos used in the mountains of Chiapas. This introduced a different image of the emerging movement, festive rather than aggressive, proactive rather than reactive, fertile ground for dialogue and plurality rather than the platform for an unequivocal expression of anger and frustration.

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The developing democratic cosmopolitarian movement, in the same way as the other types of movements that preceded it, is also made up of convergences of interests, NGOs and popular movements that do not necessarily use any formal mechanism for coordinating between them. Each component expresses both, defensively, *resistance* to the social consequences of the world

system process (the dark side of the social movement) and, positively, the *demand for democratic control* over the world system process (its light side), to use Alain Touraine's terms.

The two modes of expression—the dark side and the light side of the cosmopolitarian movement—will continue to develop in line with diverse mobilization objectives as and when this social movement, which today seems to us to be the largest in history, takes form and grows.

As of 2009, the fight against climate change served to strengthen ecological and social mobilizations. However, at the same time it also brought the movement's dark and light sides (anti-/alter-globalization) closer together: "against liberal globalization, another world is possible."

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The world system process is defined here as the dialectic between globalization and its relocation to specific territories within the framework of existing state structures.

Mobilizations within this new and merging social movement, a democratic and cosmopolitarian movement, can thus be analyzed both from a *global* point of view, with the construction of a planet-wide civil society and transnational social movement, and a *local* point of view, in the light of the many demands concerning participative democracy, community action and social and solidarity economy initiatives, as a counterpoint and counterweight to the capitalist system and its globalization.

This hypothesis, put forward over twenty years ago, is now tending to be borne out, even if the historical timescale is too short to assess the trends. We also need to avoid being misled by the inevitable ups and down of mobilization or the rapid leaps forward or sudden steps backward that movements experience.

Following the huge mobilization at Copenhagen in December 2009, after ten or so World Social Forum events and a few months after the Rio+20 summit, we feel that *the end of the Cold War did effectively enable the emergence of a new type of social movement, characterized by the radical reform of the ideological principles of modernity, as well as a transformation of mobilization strategies.* What is more, this *world social movement* has formed very rapidly from an historical point of view.

The democratic cosmopolitarian movement is *democratic* because its central demand is the political reappropriation of economic and so-

cial development; it is *cosmopolitarian* because this political reappropriation takes place on a planet-wide scale, from the local (participative urban democracy) to the global (international regulations/*global governance)* and including the national (for example, the integration of people with no legal status and granting non-nationals the right to vote) and regional integration (for example, the demands espoused by ecological and social charters).

In the history of political modernity, the democratic cosmopolitarian movement should be understood as a third type of social movement. It is the historical continuation of the two main types of previous social movements, which it encompasses: 18th century nationalitarian movements and the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist national liberation movements of the 19th and 20th centuries that sought to build nation states on the one hand, and socialist workers' movements, centring on social security, social rights and workers' democracy, on the other.

The main characteristic of the democratic cosmopolitarian movement is that, *based on a redefinition of citizenship, rights and responsibility, democracy and democratization*, it encapsulates the aspirations of post-1968 new social movements, including feminist, third world, environmental and human rights movements, while incorporating the two types of social movements that preceded it (the nationalitarian and national liberation movement on the one hand, and trade union movement on the other hand).

The world system process and democratization: global mobilizations—local manifestations

We will now look through the prism of recent history at the roots of the democratic cosmopolitarian movement in order to identify its component ideological principles and specific strategic characteristics.

Globalization of social mobilizations

The social sciences and media tend to focus on the economic dimension of the world system process phenomenon; its social dimension is often only considered to be the negative consequence of market globalization, mainly in terms of financial markets. As for the political dimension, this is the blind spot of world system process analyses.

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Nevertheless, the world system process also affects democracy and democratization, social movements (within states as well as in terms of their transnational mobilization) and the emergence of global civil society as a network of coordinated NGOs and popular movements.

Street demonstrations against the IMF, World Bank and WTO in recent years, alongside movements such as *Indignados*, Occupy and Anonymous, clearly should also be considered from the transnational viewpoint. More than that, they should be interpreted as the indicator of a deep-reaching change in political mobilization on the planetary level. In other words, the world system process has a definite influence on social mobilizations and civil society organizations, but also on their ideological position and strategies in response to politics, the state, other civil society organizations and the media.

The democratic cosmopolitarian movement, made up of a myriad of organizations, currently expresses itself in very diverse ways depending on the place and the local and national political issues. This represents both a sign of diversity and, especially, concrete rooting in local realities, where the question of the effects of the world system process and its democratic regulation has a specific application for each territory.

However, above and beyond its diversity, we need to understand its unity on the global level, and this is possibly the most important factor. For the first time in the history of humanity, the coordination and synchronization on the global level of street demonstrations as well as discussion forums may be an indicator of both the globalization of social movements and their capacity to express not only their resistance to the world system process but also, and especially, their alter-globalization projects, which will unquestionably challenge each other and thus open up *a new order of political field* and a higher level of social and political complexity.

The cosmopolitarian movement should lead to the creation of a framework wherein ideological and political debates will be recreated on the global scale: the World State.

Until this goal has been achieved, the movement needs to retain its unity; similarly to a national union within the framework of a nationalitarian movement, it should be a global union within the framework of a cosmopolitarian movement. In a second phase, within the framework of a World State, which would be a constitutional state, it would be probable, and desirable from a democratic point of view, that social projects challenge each other. The inter-party meetings on the fringe of the social forums effectively prefigure this development, with four competing and cooperating political forces gathering together: Second International socialists (Socialist International), the Global Greens, Trotskyists from the Fourth International and the Bolivarians (Chavistas/Castroites).

The social movement that remained confined within national borders during the first modernity has become globalized. But it cannot take its demands to the necessary global level until there is a World State that it can contest and hold accountable.

A post-Cold War challenge: the globalization of democracy

The first result of the call for democratization that followed the end of the Cold War was to legitimize the new world order.

Even before the fall of the Berlin wall, a homogeneous democratic position was adopted by locally mobilized civil societies and an emerging transnational civil society.

Starting in the late 1980s, the main goal of the Cold War victors, especially the USA, was indisputably to incorporate, as quickly as possible, the countries of Latin America, central and eastern Europe, the former USSR, Asia and Africa into a world system that claimed to be more homogeneous and peaceful and that they specifically sought to make more liberal.

With the strategic goal of consolidating this system, they declared that the institutions of economic liberalism and political democracy should no longer be disassociated, contradicting their claims in previous decades.

Before the 1990s, ruling liberals, in favour of market globalization on the international level, increased flexibility of labour and national privatizations, found their toughest opposition to be the defenders of state interventionism, particularly populist, mainly Latin American, nation states and socialist nation states in the former Soviet bloc and China. These two types of regimes used protectionism in a similar way to develop the populist policies their power was built on.

The most conspicuous representatives of liberal ideology, such as the exponents of the Chicago school, maintained during the 1970s and 1980s that neither democracy nor even respect for

human rights were conditions necessary to economic development. Instead, they saw authoritarian regimes, particularly in the third world, as offering the best possible conditions for the growth of production—and profit. In the 1990s, these same liberals championed the opposite idea, that the free market and democracy are two sides of the same coin and that it is important to help put in place regimes guaranteeing both components.

According to this reading, the end of the Cold War resulted in the victory of actually existing liberalism over actually existing socialism. This is not inaccurate. However, it is important to put this approach into perspective. While it is true that the hegemonic position was able to change shape, it still needed to identify where and how to take root.

The deep-reaching change in the dominant position was possible because it corresponded to the prevailing hopes of the middle and working classes. They could no longer believe in the capacity of statist policies, whether populist or socialist, to improve living conditions, and purchasing power in particular, for the majority of the population while guaranteeing wider-reaching public freedoms.

An additional and decisive factor was that civic and democratic movements in Latin American and Asia, groups of dissidents in eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and China and groups of democratic intellectuals in Africa had not waited for the end of the Cold War to demand the creation of democratic institutions, the right to political participation and respect for human rights. Neither had they waited for the disappearance of East-West antagonism to establish international, or transnational, ties that, although they were not yet called networks, had the main characteristics of this form of organization.

The prevailing view, which legitimized the new world order, was therefore unsurprisingly accepted or even developed by social actors, which then quickly went on to become systematic critics of neoliberal globalization, whose disastrous effects they could observe in their own fields. Criticism focused particularly on the policies introduced in the context of how international financial institutions (the IMF and World Bank) were run and how they managed debt in the poorest countries, as well as in the context of GATT then WTO negotiations, and on economic integration policies such as those developed by the EU and NAFTA. The meet-

ings held by the G7 then G8, the club for the richest states, became key moments in protests against the hegemonic neoliberal order.

To understand contemporary political and ideological issues, it is important to understand the *double effect of the post-Cold War discourse on democratization*. On the one hand, the universal call for democratization acted to legitimize the world order in its neoliberal form; on the other hand, a new type of social movement took form with the demand for democratization at every level of social mobilization, from the most local to the most global: *this too is the world system process*.

From fragmented to networked struggles

Contemporary social mobilizations are characterized by their fragmentation, where this is understood to mean that they are diversified, discontinuous and ephemeral.

An explosion in spheres and forms of struggle

The mobilizations that took place in the 1960s and 1970s, triggered by what was called, for want of a better term, *new* social movements, such as students', women's, human and civil rights, ethnic or cultural, pro-peace, environmental, anti-violence, anti-hunger and poverty movements, were characterized by the huge diversity of issues that took root in the public space. They were described as new because they were covered neither by the categories of scientific socialism nor by the mobilization categories used for the trade union movement.

Moreover, these movements were not making demands linked to the traditional labour-capital opposition.

Numerous issues that had been governed exclusively by the state or political powers, such as development, the environment, energy policy and international relations, and others that were seen as private, such as gender relations, contraception, sexual preferences and domestic violence, were transformed into social and political questions that could be, legitimately even, debated democratically within and outside parliaments.

In the post-Cold War world, a new issue concerning collective mobilization arose: the *world system process*. Under the influence of neoliberal ideologists, the world system process took shape via policies for deregulating state redistribution systems, with particularly harsh

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social consequences, mainly for individuals already very badly off. Resistance to these policies was thus organized almost everywhere.

In a first phase, resistance was essentially national, seeking to prevent free trade agreements being signed, such as GATT/WTO, the Maastricht Treaty and NAFTA. Once the agreements had been signed and supranational organizations had obtained further prerogatives, mobilization also changed in scale, since the way that civil society and social movements are formed and organized always mirrors the prevailing political structure. This meant that events like the anti-Maastricht European demonstrations in 1992 and European marches protesting against unemployment and lack of job security, such as in Amsterdam in June 1997, were organized with increasing frequency.

The proliferation of social movement organizations

The end of the Cold War profoundly changed the attitude of state and international organizations to civil society organizations. Public money, particularly money from the North spent on the South, was funnelled massively towards funding local and transnational NGOs. This helped to precipitate what the organizations themselves termed *the emergence of civil society*. A great many NGOs were set up or developed to tackle specific issues, mostly funded by the public powers.

Each organization found itself in a position of simultaneously competing with, cooperating with and opposing not only organizations working on the same themes, such as the environment and gender equality, but also organizations from other mobilization sectors, such as the unions and churches. It was rare for organizations' political and strategic agendas to be autonomous. Organizations in social movements usually responded to the planned and unplanned events that arose in the public space and reacted to these events within the immediate framework created by the local political system. Mobilizations therefore moved from one issue to another, in a fairly or totally uncoordinated manner, and were characterized by their discontinuity. This is confirmed by the number of organizations created all around the world with a local basis for global resistance to neoliberalism.

The proliferation of NGOs and general interest organizations in the 1980s and 1990s implied a redefinition of relations between organizations and mass mobilizations, principally in two forms: firstly, the *professionalization* of organizations and activists; secondly, increasing use by organizations of *mass communications tools*, particularly with the explosion in the use of new information and communications technologies and the social media.

These two phenomena gave organizations a relative degree of autonomy in terms of mass mobilizations. Their increased professionalism made NGOs more qualified to participate in public management. In the South and East, they were encouraged by the liberal policies adopted by the new democratic states, following the new directives espoused by bilateral and multilateral development aid (specialist UN agencies) that viewed the development of the third sector as an opportunity to privatize public services at little cost.

In the most highly industrialized countries, the liberal policies adopted in the 1980s until the late 1990s also sought the disengagement of the state while providing financial and ideological support to the not-for-profit sector with the adoption of *new public policies* within the context of a demand for the highly nebulous concept of *governance*.

Moreover, mass mobilizations created the right conditions for introducing new issues into the public space and forcing the conclusion of negotiations.

Mobilizations with a more ephemeral character

For a new generation of activists, once a specific and strategically limited goal is achieved, there is no longer any reason to pursue action, even if it proved to be powerful and popular. Sociologists therefore considered mobilizations in the late 1980s and early 1990s to be limited in time, space and political significance. Observers described them as ephemeral, without understanding the innovation they represented.

The fact is that the social relationship with political mobilization, particularly concerning young people, is now undergoing a profound change. People who take action for a specific campaign at a given moment no longer feel the desire or the need to remain permanently mobilized in more or less institutionalized organizations. Most participants are there to express their individual subjectivity, which could take shape in the public space as a civic responsibility. These ephemeral activists, *hic et nunc* philosophers, take action determined by a specific issue and their availability in terms of both time and energy. Even if they may

potentially be very numerous, it is difficult for sociologists and journalists to count them, since they never take action all at the same time.

Contemporary mobilizations are thus characterized by their fragmentation. However, it would be a methodological error to observe only this fragmentation and fail to analyze the reverse trend: the *historical continuity* of these mobilizations, *homogenization of issues* and *organization into networks* and groupings of the various mobilization sectors.

Ideological homogenization and coordination of movements

The end of the Cold War had three main consequences for social movement organizations on the global scale: the ideological and organizational renewal of the radical left, homogenization of positions and coordination of campaigns.

Renewal of the left and democratization of struggles

The first factor is that the marginalization of Communist parties initially served to heighten the ideological crisis afflicting the left and radical left, everywhere that they represented social and political forces. New types of political parties were born. The Brazilian Labour Party, for instance, a party that united the left, was open to ideological discussions and capable of integrating activists from very different political and social backgrounds, is one very good example of this political renewal. Nelson Mandela's ANC, in power since apartheid ended, is another.

The dissolution of most small Marxist-Leninist groups and incorporation of new activists into government parties not only forced activists from these organizations to engage in ideological dialogue amongst themselves and thereby subject themselves to self-criticism, but also incited them to transform their utopia into electoral, parliamentary and even governmental democratic practices. The practice of democracy, even when formal, requires negotiation and, therefore, acceptance of the concerns and demands of other political groups or social movements. Openness, dialogue and negotiation gradually helped to homogenize political discourse, reviving old issues and opening them up to the issues espoused by the new social movements. This applied to examples such as the anti-nuclear campaign, the fight to reduce working time, the struggle for gender equality and for the right to freely practice one's sexuality and the position on the imminence of a climate and energy crisis.

Towards permanent democratization

In the late 1980s, everywhere in the world system, political concepts previously considered as bourgeois and reactionary made a forceful entry into the discourse of the left, including its most radical fringe, with positive connotations: democracy and democratization; civil society and NGOs; individual and civic responsibility; respect for identity and difference in a spirit of solidarity and equality; market regulation; debureaucratization of the state; respect for the environment and the climate along with the parsimonious use of energy and adoption of the precautionary principle for the benefit of future generations; the campaign against violence, etc.

Struggles for the rights of women, homosexuals, prisoners, those with psychological or mental disorders, linguistic, ethnic, religious and regional minorities, immigrants and refugees, for the right to the city, to housing, health, education and a healthy environment penetrated political organizations and transformed the social movement itself. In seeking to apply the principle it defended here and now, rather than adopting a wait-and-see approach, the social movement became the expression of the society it wished to see emerge.

New organizations within the democratic cosmopolitarian movement, such as the neo-Zapatistas, Peoples' Global Action (PGA) and ATTAC[8], have fully incorporated into their discourse the demands expressed by the new social movement of the 1970s and 1980s, while promoting the idea of democracy and social self-organization.

Democratization thus emerges as the key concept among all the concepts updated by the new discourse of the radical left. Even if, as we saw earlier, the idea of democratization served to legitimize the new world order, social movements enthusiastically took up the democratic principle and made it a priority demand.

In the left's new position, or the position of this new left, *democracy is a social ideal, a collective virtuality that is limited by social relations but whose (1) premises can be broadened, (2) principles developed and (3) rights extended to a larger number of subjects.*

By incorporating cultural, political and social actions into a democratization process, the

different issues raised by social movements, both old and new, can be organized based on principles rather than rules or programmes. *Mobilization is now driven by rights promoting more equality, more liberty, more solidarity, informed by recognition of inherited or elected identities and the respect for differences:* the permanent struggles against alienation and for the emancipation and autonomy of individuals and social groups is the new normative framework wherein are deployed the ethics and political practices of this new social movement, which I call the democratic cosmopolitarian movement.

In this context, the democratic cosmopolitarian movement is part of a bicentennial process and an historical continuity that stretches back to the birth of political modernity, in other words, the potential unlocked by that emblematic event, the French Revolution of 1789. In simple terms, 1989 radicalized, extended and universalized the aspiration for democracy by globalizing it, taking it from the local to the global level.

In this period of transition that began after 1989, referring to a closed utopia or even a political *programme* thus loses meaning. The end of scientific Marxism has liberated the social and the political. The purpose of social mobilization is no longer seen as the quest for taking over political power. What is important now is the expansion of individual and collective participation in the self-organization of struggles and citizen oversight of authority.

From this viewpoint, the social movement's rejection of the political has liberated the social, but has relegated the political to the realm of the unthought. The democratic transnational movement is not yet cosmopolitarian. Possibly it has not yet understood the importance of the existence of the World State, as a partner/opponent in negotiations for global demands and the guarantee that freedoms and the exercise of formal democracy, from the local to the global scale, can truly be enjoyed.

Homogenization of positions and coordination of strategies via transnational NGO networks

Simultaneously, on the political level, the end of the Cold War endorsed the new role played by international organizations, particularly the UN. The beginnings of world governance began to take shape. And it was outside citizens' control.

A series of summits, such as the Earth Summit (Rio 1992, Johannesburg 2002, Rio+20) and

events focusing on women (Peking 1995), social development (Copenhagen 1995, Geneva 2000), housing (Habitat II, Istanbul 1996) and climate (Tokyo 1997, Copenhagen 2009), offered NGOs the chance to gather together during the organization of counter-summits. This was also the case for the WTO summits in Geneva (1998) and Seattle (1999), even though summit opposition strategy still prevailed over counter-summit strategy.

The most interesting element of counter-summits is not so much the political importance of mobilizations at the international level, but the fact that the organizations exploit the presence of the media to present their topical issues under a different angle, one that corresponds more closely to the concerns of those excluded from official negotiations, and thus they have gradually built up the outlines of a homogenous alter-globalization discourse.

As far as collective action is concerned, the counter-summits have two especially important effects. First, they force many organizations to work together on a specific issue, from the most local level (to prepare delegations) to the global level and including the national level. From an educational standpoint, this has a major impact. Activists' understanding of different subjects and the general level of knowledge of issues and popular politicization are increasing thanks to a percolation effect, which also encourages the universalization of values.

For instance, the Rio (1992) and Copenhagen (1995) counter-summits served to lessen differences between environmentalists and developmentalists by popularizing the concept of sustainable development. The Peking counter-summit (1995) forced the two preceding movements to give a central place to feminist questions within sustainable development. The Copenhagen event (1995), by opening debate on *human* security (food, economic, health, environmental, political and personal security) and *human* development, linked three generations of human rights and made the human rights issue into the common denominator of specific demands. All the demands formulated by civil society have now been translated into rights and are thus rooted in the notion of the constitutional state.

In addition, the official summits often draw up statements or agendas that states and governments use as recommendations. Since these texts do not tend to be binding, they are not usually enforced. However, they provide an agenda that civil society organizations can use

to formulate demands to negotiate with their own governments and exert pressure on local, national and international public opinion. Local Agenda 21, particularly its participative aspect, is an excellent example of the opportunity for exerting citizen pressure on local authorities and their public administrations.

A second social consequence of the counter-summits is the gradual creation of international and transnational civil society: international in reference to the leaders and representatives who form the NGO jet-set and spent much time travelling and meeting together; transnational when we look at the informal networks of activists and citizens who use it to build up their personal contacts and take part in electronic and social networks on current political issues.

NGO groupings at counter-summits are an important element in international mobilizations. But they represent only one aspect of the transnationalization of citizens' movement mobilization. A number of activists have been very quick to level criticism against NGOs (and the new power they acquired in the post-Cold War period) as well as the counter-summits. They accuse NGOs of becoming the executors of government decisions, cutting themselves off from popular experiences and demands (despite being the fruit of these demands and usually continuing to espouse them) and contributing to the lack of effective organization and press relations at counter-summits.

For instance, in the mid-1990s, the neo-Zapatista[9] group *Peoples' Global Action* (PGA), a collection of organizations including the Zapatista Army of National Liberation, the Brazilian Landless Workers' Movement and English anarchic-ecologist militants from Reclaim the Streets, was the specific product of the desire for demarcation from NGO lobbying in order to create a parallel structured network of *popular movements*, formally disassociated from NGO networks.

The activists operating in this movement were behind the anti-WTO demonstrations in Geneva and closely involved in the Seattle demonstrations. Their strategy of non-violent direct action is aimed at demonstrating potential force rather than exerting political pressure on governments to negotiate with them. In this area, the PGA indisputably drew on the ideology and strategy elaborated by neo-Zapatism.

It is also important to point out that their regular confrontations with the police served to give their actions a high media profile, more than forums with debates and convergence workshops would have done. And it had the more far-reaching effect of creating a real popular audience for the whole of the anti- and alter-globalization movement.

The World Social Forums, as a counterpoint to the Davos Economic Forums, which continued to mobilize anti-globalization activists, also served to develop and homogenize the alter-globalization position while broadening the social base of the emerging democratic cosmopolitarian movement.

It would be useful at this stage to describe its creation and development from a sociological viewpoint.

From Anti- to Alter-globalization

Geneva, benefiting from the post-Cold War UN boom and home to the headquarters of the WTO and the Davos *World Economic Forum* (WEF), began to play a major role in transnational mobilization transnational as of 1998.

The first WTO summit in May 1998 was the ideal occasion for rallying the troops and assessing the impact of mobilization. The *anti-globalization movement* was born. While still in its infancy, the door was opened to incorporating questions linked to free trade into NGO networks' agendas, and the first phase of alter-globalization took shape.

In terms of protest, the 1998 Geneva demonstrations were just a foretaste of the global mobilizations to come. It was in Seattle, at the 3rd WTO Inter-Ministerial Conference in November 1999, that the movement established a forceful media and political presence. It was in Seattle that ties were forged between the transnational NGO networks, with all the issues they covered, the international trade union movement, including the very powerful North American unions, and peasant movements recently organized into international groupings, including Via Campesina. Seattle should therefore be recognized as the culmination of the *anti*-globalization movement. Seattle also saw the association of the movement's two branches, the institutional branch open to negotiation (NGOs, unions, etc.) and the confrontational branch (anarchists, *black blocks*, independents, etc.): the movement's two wings could not pretend to ignore each other. Their antagonism had to be resolved, mainly regarding the role of rioters during the demonstration. The challenge was to define the

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9. See below, *The Zapatista example*, p.33.

meaning of non-violent direct action. They had to negotiate this definition, and did so on a case-by-case basis, during each *global mobilization* that produced *local demonstrations*. The climate demonstration in Copenhagen in 2009 proved that, in ten years, the movement had succeeded in associating its two dimensions.

Geneva plays an important role in transnational networks: Geneva saw the founding of Peoples' Global Action (PGA) in February 1998 then the international network, ATTAC. And it was in Geneva, during the Social Summit (Copenhagen+5) in 2000, that an important Brazilian delegation of NGOs accompanied by the vice-governor of Rio Grande do Sul state (Miguel Rossetto, a minister in Lula's first government), chose to officially make the proposal to the organizations present, including those mobilizing against the Davos World Economic Forum, to hold a *World Social Forum in Porto Alegre* as a counterpoint to the Davos forum. A forum in the *South* rather than the North, a *social* rather than economic forum. A forum for active *citizens* rather than the mighty of this world. A forum in a city and a state governed by the Labour Party, which unified a large part of the Brazilian left and was credited for having introduced an innovative form of local public management: the participative budget. A proactive forum, designed to give an outlet to the desire for change (the light side of social movements), while respecting diversity, in opposition to demonstrations seeking to disturb the meetings of the mighty (the movement's dark side, the element of resistance). On a global scale, the two expressions of the same movement became visible simultaneously.

The first World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, in January 2001, can be considered as the founding moment of alter-globalization. The scope of the event came as a surprise, and the forum was marked by joy and good humour. It saw the resurgence of faith in the possibility of social transformation, at time when the media, especially CNN, were sending out images from Davos and Zurich to the entire world of a Switzerland dug in behind its barbed wire, protecting those cynical few who held the world's economic, political and ideological power in their hands. The effect on public opinion was disastrous. The WSF showed worldwide public opinion that a credible alternative was emerging. And that the movement could be involved in violent confrontation, as confirmed by Goteborg and Genoa in June and July 2001, but that it could also peacefully gather together

tens of thousands of activists with the sole objective of taking discussion of ideas further. The first WSF opened the door to possible alliances between *municipal authorities and local civil society* based on questions concerning urban governance (the Local Authorities Forum, which became a UCLG commission a few years later), implementation of Local Agenda 21 programmes and *participative democracy*, exemplified by the city of Porto Alegre and its participative budget.

The second Porto Alegre WSF, in 2002, marked a development in how the movement was structured, with the adoption of a Charter of Principles at Porto Alegre that enabled other social segments, both transnational and local, to identify themselves with the movement and associate their networks with it. Significant progress was made on three fronts: firstly, the forum marked the arrival of *social and solidarity economy* networks in the alter-globalization world. These companies, seeking to produce goods and services but not for profit or for limited profit, present a concrete and contemporary alternative to undiluted capitalism. Secondly, research and training centres became participants in their own right in the Porto Alegre process for the first time. Their goal is to create networks of researchers and trainers who will work together with alter-globalization movement organizations. This produced the Science & Democracy Forum, which became independent from the social forums. Lastly, and most importantly, the second WSF will go down in the history of social mobilization for *the movement's decentralization* and the creation of *continental, national, regional and local forums*. The time had come to effectively and systematically link concrete local political actions, often limited in scope, to national regional and transnational networks. This pioneering process is still operating, even though it has taken on different forms depending on the continent, country and city, since the world system process should always be considered as the relocation of global (planetary) phenomena.

It is not possible here to assess either the explosion of idea- and action-based networks or their importance in terms of mobilization. However, following the European Social Forum in Florence in November 2002 and its peaceful demonstration with over a million people and, especially, the anti-war demonstrations on 15 February 2003 that had been decided on in Florence together with the WSF Coordination Committee, we can be certain that the force

of this movement has unique characteristics: it triggered unprecedented demonstrations right around the world and led to both the mobilization of the Arab-Muslim world (whose relationship with the Arab Spring and Jasmine Revolutions has not been explored) as well as the closer ties between the anti-globalization movement and pacifist and anti-imperialist movements.

Anti-war mobilization thus helped to broaden the movement's base by incorporating, on a larger scale, the pacifist and antimilitarist movements that had literally disappeared since the 1991 war against Iraq. In point of fact, demonstrations for global justice and debt cancellation had been planned on 30 September 2001 throughout the world to counter the IMF and World Bank meeting meant to take place in New York. The meeting was cancelled in the wake of the 11 September attacks. The demonstrations went ahead, under the slogan "to prevent globalized terror, let's fight for global justice." The main idea was to express solidarity with the victims of indiscriminate terror in the USA, refuse warlike reprisals and demand general disarmament and the cancellation of poor countries' external debts.

The third WSF, held in Porto Alegre in 2003, continued to expand the movement's ideological and social base. Without abandoning any of the issues previously tackled, it focused on the democratization of information and communications, a key challenge in the 21st century, and on creating planetary-scale alternative media networks.

The fourth forum in Mumbai, India, in 2004 represented a move away from the Latin America (mainly Brazil)/Europe axis. Preparation of the WSF in an Asian forum was a promising experience: however, even though this WSF was an undeniable success, particularly with the role played by the Dalits (untouchables), there are currently no signs pointing to the prospect of a consolidated democratic cosmopolitarian movement in Asia and Oceania coming to fruition. Even though India and Indonesia are both formally democratic countries and open to the world, and although other countries in South East Asia, recently even including Burma, seem to be following in their footsteps, the situation is less certain in China, despite undeniably democratic currents having surfaced there since 1989 and Tiananmen.

As the fifth WSF returned to Porto Alegre in 2005, the movement may well have appeared to have stalled, even if it did attract the highest number of visitors, with 150,000 participants.

This forum was very important from the standpoint of the ideological consolidation process, particularly in terms of methodological excellence, with a coherent theme-based framework organized into 11 territories and the idea that proposals should be hierarchized and prioritized. This methodology was partially replicated by the Rio+20 Peoples' Summit, especially for the theme-based round tables that fed into the overall process of reflection.

The sixth WSF in 2006 was decentralized for the first time and held in different venues around the world: in Bamako (Mali), the democratization of Africa was on the agenda and the *World Charter of Migrants was launched*. The issue of migration and the link between development and migration was fully incorporated into the ideological framework of the alter-globalization movement. At the same time, the question raised in Caracas (Venezuela) concerned the situation in progressive states and the democratization of society. Under the influence of President Chavez and his attempts to build a *revolutionary Bolivarian movement* throughout the American continent, the forum was on the verge of being politically instrumentalized. But it is impossible to appropriate a forum due to its very nature, and the most productive result of this delocalized WSF was the creation of networks of movements and not-for-profit organizations defending communities affected by the extension of mining. This network, which has since continued to build up, particularly currently with the fight against land grabbing, will undoubtedly be one of the central branches of alter- and anti- globalization mobilizations in the decades to come in Latin America as well as Africa. The third decentralized WSF should have taken place in Karachi, Pakistan, but following the terrible earthquake that struck just before the planned date, it was cancelled.

The seventh WSF took place in Nairobi, in 2007. The fact that Wangari Maathai, founder of the Kenyan Green Party in 1987, former minister for the environment and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2004, played an important role in Kenyan civil society and that her Green Belt Movement was recognized the world over probably greatly influenced the choice of Nairobi. But it was not the only reason that the choice fell on Africa. The 2007 WSF was extremely important in that it was the first time that so many Africans from so many different African regions came together in the same place to discuss a number of African and global

problems. This was also one of the forum's significant achievements.

If we draw a parallel with the Mumbai forum, we cannot be sure that the WSF itself was the highly productive factor; it was more likely to have been preparations for the WSF at continental forums, particularly the Bamako forum the previous year.

Moving the WSF to different continents made it possible to recognize that the forums' social composition changed depending on where it was held, but also to observe the link between the movement, civil society and the state.

Around 80% of WSF participants are local, or from places nearby. Holding a forum first and foremost serves to consolidate local civil society. Kenyan civil society, probably one of the most organized in Africa, is not as developed as Brazilian civil society. Venezuelan civil society suffers from overdetermination due to its relationship with the Chavist state.

Although the Nairobi WSF attracted fewer visitors than previous events, it nevertheless contributed to strengthen the movement's social base and broaden the ideological issues on several levels. Firstly, in what was a first, trade union organizations from all over the world chose the WSF to collectively launch a global campaign: the Decent Work Campaign. Then, also for the first time, the leading peasant federations decided to launch an agrarian reform process at the world level. Thirdly, endorsement of Wangari Maatai's campaign to plant a billion trees around the world, the Billion Tree Campaign, supported by the United Nations Environment Programme, anchored ecological concerns in the fabric of the forums. It had taken seven years for ecological issues to take their place alongside the movement's social concerns. They remained central from that moment on, foreshadowing the events of Copenhagen in 2009.

The next World Social Forum that deserves mentioning is the one that took place in Belem (Brazilian Amazonia) in January 2009. The global financial crisis was in full swing—or at least, that was the word from Davos. Tens of thousands of activists from all over the world went away with the renewed conviction that another world was not only possible, it was inevitable. Following the *subprime crisis* and prospect of a crisis of sovereign debts, particularly in Europe and the USA, the world system seemed to be at the end of its tether.

Defending Amazonia means defending the diversity of life against the destructive system of exploiting resources and human beings. The great lesson of ecology is taught by native people who have fully grasped the importance of the historical role they have to play in today's world.

Ecological and social questions became inextricably linked within the world social movement. That was what came out of Belem.

The next WSF, in Dakar in 2011, confirmed this point. The issue of migration was central and opened up a vast field of debate, particularly as regards migrants' future relationship with the places they are from in a world that has shrunk greatly in 20 years. And the Arab Spring brought fresh hope and a ray of joy to the forum.

Since the global economic and financial crisis, no one takes Davos seriously any more and demonstrations are less radical, less violent. The separation between those who mobilize against the world system and its summits and those who mobilize for another world is less marked. And the Copenhagen Climate Summit proved that the movement has reached another stage in its development.

Mobilization during the Climate Summit in December 2009 in Copenhagen marked a turning point for the democratic cosmopolitarian movement. For the first time, *the key actors of world governance* were gathered together in the same city over several days successively in an unprecedented encounter between political society, civil society and the social movement.

States were strongly represented and at a very high political level. In terms of positioning—and for the first time since the 1992 Earth Summit—we were seeing governing actors' appropriation of the sustainable development discourse and homogenization of the discourse on the causes and consequences of the climate crisis. This discourse was probably only window dressing, but it nevertheless marked progress for civil society, which could then take governing actors at their word, even if their sincerity is open to doubt. And, evidently, there are greatly diverging views in different states on the solutions to the crisis and the efforts each state should make.

As regards state actors, *the Group of 77* has been reenergized, mainly thanks to China's support. China has become a key state actor, particularly since the impact of the economic and financial crisis on Europe and the USA. The modern world system is further speeding up China's global reach.

The *multilateral* UN world emerged as a new actor. We saw, for the first time, a major mobilization amongst international civil servants; it was not so much their numbers in the corridors of international organizations or amongst official national delegations that were noticeable, but rather the expertise and personal commitment shown by this very homogeneous *sui generis* new social category of international civil servants. Over the space of a few years, during various more or less official meetings between experts from the different UN agencies and other international organizations, it is noticeable how Geneva has become the centre of this emerging world governance.

Furthermore, the *major transnational corporations* were also represented. They too developed a uniform corporate discourse on corporate social and environmental responsibility. In the same way as applies to states, this transformed discourse is crucial for civil society organizations, because it makes is possible to take action to ensure that corporates keep their word.

Finally, cities and local governments, in the form of the ICLEI and UCLG, were also represented at the inter-ministerial conference as well as at a parallel cities' forum.

Mirroring this, the *major international NGOs* were all also involved. They were present both at the inter-ministerial conference (another first), the counter-summit (Climate Forum) and on the streets leading demonstrations denouncing the bad faith and cowardice of heads of state and governments.

In a great many countries, national NGOs are organized into *national climate groupings,* and have succeeded in having one or more representatives included as part of official state delegations. This highlights the contradictions between discourse and practice within government delegations. Indeed, it is probably this contradiction between an ever more uniform discourse and ever more polarized actors, dependent on their own national logics, that caused the agreement to fail, or rather, led to the absence of any agreement, which is a very different thing, since everything will have to be picked up again at the 2012 Rio summit and those that follow.

Organizations of social movements, trade unions, peasants, environmentalists, developmentalists, indigenous peoples, and so on, all those the world social forums have helped to bring together within an alter-globalization process over the last ten years, were also present, notably at the Climate Forum, which was similar to an issue-based WSF with a very rich content. In addition, they were active in the major demonstration called to oppose the negotiations, which placed them alongside radical groups advocating direct confrontation (black blocks) that turned out in large numbers.

To sum up, in December 2009 in Copenhagen we witnessed, at the same time and in the same place, a UN-sponsored multilateral conference, a meeting of the G20 (similar to those in London and Washington) and a summit of cities and local governments on the one hand and, on the other hand, a World Social Forum (Climate Forum) and a confrontational demonstration similar to those called against the WEF in Davos, against the G8/G20 or against meetings of the World Bank, IMF and WTO.

Overall, there was a growing awareness that we were facing a systemic world crisis—a global crisis with, in different ways, repercussions for the whole planet.

The frequency with which catastrophic world-shaking events (environmental, economic, technological, etc.) occur has been increasing constantly for the past two centuries, and has accelerated even more over the last three decades, an indication that the system is reaching a turning point. The idea that the world system is unsustainable is gaining ground, even amongst the governing classes. The positions adopted by participants at the Davos World Economic Forum resemble those espoused at Porto Alegre.

The Zapatista example

At this juncture I would like to propose an examination of what, for a few years during the post-Cold War period, was an emblematic movement: the *neo-Zapatistas*. The first glimmer of a mobilization against the new world order proclaimed by George Bush Snr. and the advocates of the end of history, this movement offered a prefiguration of the desire for global governance as espoused by the democratic cosmopolitarian movement.

In the mountains of Chiapas, Subcommandante Marcos did not appear to have drawn inspiration from the theorists of eastern European dissent and yet, even though he chose armed struggle, his message strongly resembled that of central and eastern European democrats, which was taken up by citizens' movements in Europe and then given new impetus by the social forum process.

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His central theme is *citizenship*. The strength of Marcos' message is to interweave various forms of citizenship within a multi-level global democracy.

His message identifies four levels of demands from four types of social movement that were not previously linked, and might indeed have been seen as antagonistic: identity-based (Mayan), nationalitarian (Chiapan), national liberation (Mexican/Zapatista) and global/universal (against imperialism, dubbed "for life and against neoliberalism").

Marcos chose 1 January 1994, the day the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into force, threatening indigenous community land ownership (*ejido*), to initiate a new type of guerrilla movement ("armed non-violence") in Chiapas. The guerrillas were not seeking power, but to take the government at its word, as had Vaclav Havel and Charter 77 during the 1980s.

This was a new form of dissidence. It stood for the implementation of a process of political, social and cultural democratization in support of the most marginalized members of society. Marcos' message is both very consistent (a Marxist reading of the modern world system that places economic globalization at the centre of its analysis) and very flexible in terms of the forms of struggle that he suggests. His media impact found an echo mainly among the young. It was said that young people were not politicized, so their radicalism took everybody by surprise: traditional political parties, NGOs and unions, even the police. He was also the first person to use the internet to mobilize people, but in 1994 the technology was still in its infancy.

Marcos' message was poetic, yet full of self-mockery; it resonated among young people and it is to him that we owe the spectacular globalization of protest, centred on the idea of an "intergalactic" struggle "*for life and against neoliberalism.*" The neo-Zapatista message also struck a chord amongst intellectuals and internationalist activists. Marcos was one of the first to put a new name to the enemy: *neoliberalism*. In so doing, neo-Zapatistas denounced an ideology, termed the dominant ideology (the hegemonic thought) of the new global system. The movement held out the hope of participating in a shared combat, in the name of shared values, led in a co-ordinated way. It boosted local struggles by instilling them with renewed revolutionary and, more exactly, insurrectional, vigour. This is another important

feature; its goal is the democratization of society and the end of avant-garde ideology.

In terms of organizing this mobilization, La Realidad, the large Zapatista meeting in 1997, was a precursor to the social forums, just like the Helsinki Citizens' Assemblies held between 1990 and 1995.

Most importantly, in ideological terms Marcos was the first to state that there was no contradiction—quite the opposite—between different levels of demands expressed in the past by very varied movements: Mayan, Chiapan and Mexican. His message was also global/universal (against imperialism, dubbed "for life and against neoliberalism"), but he lacked a political dimension. He lacked a *cosmopolitarian* dimension, encompassing the necessary constitution of a World State to ensure the possibility of world governance that would build a world where many worlds fit, something that I believe can only be achieved with a (challengeable) World State.

We should not forget that, in international mobilization terms, Marcos was the first to use the internet. The international squatter's movement was quick to grasp his message and put it into practice as, with the Peoples' Global Action, it backed local mobilizations by welcoming transnational activists into squats, as we saw during the anti-WTO (Geneva 1998) and anti-G8 (Evian 2003) demonstrations. Young people were quickly won over by mobilization strategies and non-violent direct action techniques borrowed from the UK Reclaim the Streets movement.

Similarly, in recent years we have seen the emergence of new forms of political mobilization such as the *Indignados*, Occupy and Anonymous movements. At first glance—although they are still too recent to be analyzed with sufficient distance—these new mobilizations comprise new expressions of resistance to the system at the global level. They are part of the dark side of the social movement and do not appear (at the time of writing) to be linked to a proactive social movement (its light side). I do not think, therefore, that as currently constituted this comprises a "new social movement', but it might comprise the basis for resistance to the current systemic crisis, a proactive cosmopolitarian movement for greater individual freedom, equality and solidarity.

What is, however, undeniable in these mobilizations is the arrival of new, younger, actors who

call on new repertoires of actions and embrace new issues. These include the campaign led by Occupy against financial profiteers and by Anonymous for total internet freedom within the public space worldwide.

World Governance: the democratic form of the World State

This chapter aims to show that *there can be no governance without a state, and thus no world governance without a World State*. A power that is not institutionalized in a fully transparent manner will remain at the mercy of dark forces that cannot be fought freely and democratically.

The notion of governance is a term that appeared recently to designate a "new" form of government. The definition that I suggest here is the one most commonly used, as far as I know, in modern political science, which does not make it exempt from criticism—quite the opposite.

There are two meanings commonly used for the term governance, but these two meanings stem from the same root: on the one hand, the *political* idea of leading, establishing order and governing, on the other hand, the idea of *participation* in the broader sense, or of *consultation*, uniting the different forces, acting in concert, agreeing; this encompasses the entry into the decision-making process of stakeholders other than the holders of legal decision-making powers (the state and its bureaucracy).

Together, these two meanings generally fall within what political scientists define as public policy. This refers both to decisions taken concerning a *political vision,* the general *strategic orientations* and *objectives* for the medium to long term, as well as to *operational decisions* regarding the *implementation* of the policy decided upon.

There are three broad stakeholder categories within public policy: the state and its bureaucracy, private businesses and civil society in the narrow sense, i.e. associations defending interest groups or values.

Only within a modern political system is it possible to differentiate between these three categories. Governance is located outside the political system as such, which comprises the type of state (unitary, federal, etc.), electoral system (proportional, uninominal, etc.) and party system (multiparty, bi-party, etc.).

> **Governance** is defined here as a way of governing a ***modern state*** that chooses to open its decision-making processes concerning the direction, implementation and oversight of its public policy to non-state stakeholders (private businesses and associations defending interest groups or values). The state may delegate its powers to infra- or supra-state political structures.

When we refer to the notion of governance, I remain convinced (despite the wider definitions one reads here and there) that it is the state—in the modern sense of the term—that remains the formal holder of power, from the start to the end of the process, whether or not it chooses to directly exercise this power.

For at the national level, at the least, it is the state that divides its actions into sector-based public policies and that thereby divides the fields of governance; it can delegate these to infra- or supra-state political structures, as a function of its own criteria for centralization-decentralization, concentration-deconcentration and subsidiarity-multi-level governance.

It is the state, too, that defines the degree of openness within the participative process (ranging from information and consultation to joint decision-making), designates the stakeholders and sets the guidelines, duration of the process and scope of the decisions taken.

Finally, it is the state that is both *responsible* and *accountable* in the final resort for every element of public policy decided upon (or not) and put in place (or quietly forgotten).

From this viewpoint, governance is thus a *method* of government within the *modern system.* The practice of governance does nothing to interfere with power structures within society (economic exploitation, political domination, cultural hegemony), nor does it alter the balance of power in economic, technical, political, religious, social and cultural fields. Governance can be authoritarian or democratic, and usually lies somewhere between these two extremes. Governance is not a moral standard, *a priori* it is neither good nor bad. "Good" governance is not a notion from political science, it is an ideological and moral notion.

Democrats hold that "good governance" must needs be democratic, but not everybody agrees.

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In order to understand the relationship between global governance and the social movement, it is necessary to look at this definition from an historical standpoint, locating it in time and space: the time shall be modernity, the space the world system.

In every language and every cultural space, the concept of governance can cover a range of very divergent realities. This would not matter were it not question of setting up a world governance that has to be legitimate to all cultures and linked from the global to the local within highly varied political and social contexts.

Within every nation state, the process of modernization creates a dialogue between traditional values and practices and those of modernity. And for every nation state, it is this relationship between modernity and tradition that defines the operational scope of governance.

Every human society has to decide how its politics are regulated. Every society provides itself with political institutions to ensure that decisions about managing the community as a whole and the course chosen for its future development are taken in a manner that is legitimate.

In pre-modern societies, power was exercised without any recognition of political and ideological pluralism, secularism and the equality of each free individual before the law. Modernity introduced a paradigm shift by introducing, in political terms, the principle of *the constitutional state*.

Modernity further posits the *principle of the individual* as a central value, especially via modernity's democratic dimension (one person, one voice). With modernity, the individual is no longer conceived in terms of a place in the community or social hierarchy, nor in terms of a social role, but as an autonomous person, equal under law with any other person. Modernity contains a principle of democratization.

Democratic world governance is impossible without a World State (a constitutional state) and world government to guide public policies

I feel the concept of governance to be intrinsically linked to the concept of the modern state, by the very fact that *governance* is not direct *government*, but rather is the participative extension of government within the implementation phase of public policies; a more open, indirect and participative form of government.

But what of governance within an economic, political and socio-cultural world system that has experienced 20 years of fast-accelerating globalization?

- Actors involved in local or sector governance, primarily from what is known as civil society, face insurmountable contradictions. We expect them to solve problems with a strictly limited territorial or issue-based nature whose causes are often extremely complex and lie far beyond the limits of any one territory; this is a cause of profound frustration and a growing sense of powerlessness.

What, to put it another way, of governance in the contemporary world system, where the interdependence of states is ever greater, where there are an ever larger number of ever more important problems to solve collectively, and where non-state actors organize themselves at a level that is no longer inter-national (or, more accurately, inter-state), but that is transnational or, more exactly, global?

- There is no legitimate institutional framework to render negotiations between actors valid and operational. The recent Rio+20 Conference is a fine example.

What of governance in a world political system without world government?

- It is the outcome of the effects of systems beyond the reach of democratic controls.

What of governance in a world political system where not everything pertaining to a modern state cannot be organized within an institutional or legal framework, and which knows no legitimate form of regulation to give coherence to decisions taken and to assume responsibility for them?

- There is no coherency in the world system, with governments themselves cultivating contradictions: the positions of a health minister at the WHO or a labour minister at the WTO often contradict the proposals made by another minister from the same government to the WTO or IMF.

What of world governance without a World State or world government?

- World governance is a very recent idea. The notion is usually used without being defined, although freighted with a heavy emotional load. Everybody tries to make it embody what they want: part frustration and part hope. The expression world governance speaks of a deception, a lack (there is no world governance!), yet simultaneously the desire for another world, better regulated, less random and arbitrary.

In order for a world governance to emerge, governance that is effective, real and concrete, not simply a virtual or phantasmagorical abstraction, we need an array of political and ideological

positions on the political aspects of globalization, the question of power *inside* international and multilateral politics (UN, ILO, WTO, etc.) *and outside* (imperialisms, the power of multinational corporations, financial markets, mafias, etc.). However, none of the main political families venture onto this terrain. The parties express their views on *local or national* projects for society. When they take a stance on an *international* issue, it is almost invariably in defence of their national interests within the concert of nations. Never do political parties set out a programme for implementing *world politics*.

However, a democratic World State run by a legitimate world government is the only political form capable of allowing the world community to together take its destiny in hand. Only a legitimate world government would be able to put in place the world public policies that humanity needs to survive and evolve in peace and harmony. These public policies, in areas such as management of resources and humanity's common goods, health and the environment, conditions for regulating corporate social and environmental responsibility and migrations and global trade, might open the way for specific fields of world governance. In this context, the main political families would no doubt each have highly differing ideological positions, differences that the democratic system could settle.

If it is not a world democratic system—of whatever type—that generates proposals and enables decisions to be taken, how can we claim that such decisions are legitimate? In which social principles would they be founded? God? Nature? Reason? Progress? Common sense? Self-proclaimed civil society?

The core questions that arise from the democratic standpoint centre on the mode of representation, the decision-making process, the mechanism for contesting decisions and overseeing their implementation and the sanctions for those that break the rules. This is what will enable decisions to be perceived as legitimate and accepted, even by the minority, and will in the final analysis create the feeling that, even in the event of disagreement, we all belong to a single human community. Regarding this point, what applies locally or nationally applies all the more at the world level.

How and using which procedure is it possible to dispute the validity of these decisions in terms of their form and content? Who decides to implement decisions? And how do we check that they are properly implemented? Who enforces sanctions if decisions are not respected? And who is seen as legitimately in charge of law enforcement?

- If world governance is part of a political system that has answered all these questions, it will necessarily be part of a World State.

The existence of a constitutional state at the world level in no way prefigures either the *form of the state* that would need to be put in place (more or less confederal, more or less unitary?), the type of political system (more or less parliamentary, one, two, three or more chambers?), the *electoral* system (electoral college or direct representatives, a lottery?) or the *complex interconnections between representative democracy, participative democracy and direct democracy* that could be established to ensure the respect, or even the promotion, of diversity and minorities.

In this context, *governance*, which is a system of contradictory relationships and unstable regulations enabling governments to govern via consultation, would also have a full role to play.

The idea of a World State is not new, especially as a solution to prevent wars. But today it is the very survival of our species that renders it necessary. And the human community is more self-aware today than it was at the end of WW2. WW1 led to the League of Nations, WW2 produced the UN, European integration and the creation of a large number of states born of nationalitarian decolonization movements.

Will we have to wait for a third World War before we manage to create a third type of international organization, one that reflects the progress the world system process has made in the 21st century? What assurances do we have that this third type of international organization will be democratic and constitutionally based?

This Proposal Paper is not intended to define the form of a future World State. This is an issue to be discussed by the democratic cosmopolitarian movement.

The question examined in this Proposal Paper concerns changes in social movements over the past twenty years and their relationship to world governance.

Today, I have reached the conclusion that what hinders the advance of social movements at the world, national and local levels is the absence of a political framework they can set their demands against.

Today, the modern world system is changing and being changed at the humanity-wide level.

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We have seen how the transnational social movement (anti- and alter-globalization) is the social expression of this changing scale.

The same question arose in the 19th century. Nationalitarian movements demanded the creation of certain states, and social forces exerted themselves to great effect, particularly the trade union movement.

We have reached the same point today, but at the world level.

The proposals that follow might seem very timid when compared to the size of the task. This is simply because we have to start at the beginning, and the starting point is—despite the urgency—to *thoroughly consider* the framework for collective action and to carefully *assemble the necessary forces* before embarking on the adventure of the democratic cosmopolitarian movement.

Remember that time spent preparing is not time wasted—far from it! It is the very urgency of the situation that means we cannot afford to get our strategy wrong.

Question

How can we contribute to the emergence of a democratic cosmopolitarian movement able to produce the world-level and modern political form that will make it possible to implement multi-level world governance based on active subsidiarity?

2. Proposals

In this part of the document, I am starting with a number of observations drawn from the arguments cited above, then using them to formulate proposals.

For each proposal, I will set out the objectives, suggest actions and designate the strategic actors that need to be mobilized in order to achieve these objectives.

1. First observation: The global/planetary level of governance is in the unthought realm of the political

If democratic world governance is to see the light of day, it will be necessary for a political discourse about the political aspects of globalization to exist; this is not the case at present.

There are, of course, scientific and academic discourses about the *political* globalization that exist within the framework of social and political sciences, law and international relations.

There are also political and ideological discourses about *economic* globalization (the power of markets and multinationals) and *cultural* globalization (*cultural imperialism, the uniformization and Westernization of the world*).

Political parties, no matter their ideological orientation, build discourses about the political dimension at every politico-institutional level their action is likely to reach. These discourses can centre on local governments and councils, the relationship between the national state and regions or federal states (where applicable) or the relationship between nation states and regional integration (EU, MERCOSUR, ASEAN, etc.).

No ideological discourse, be it from political parties, civil society organizations or the transnational social movement, poses the question of world governance as such[10].

The Forum for a new World Governance Proposal Papers have provided an initial overview, a vital step in the creation of a discourse. But no forum for discussion and debate can ever replace the political institutions formed by the leading political families; at best, a forum might offer to help stage their debates.

Today, political parties (and their ideologies) find themselves facing an insurmountable contradiction, which explains their disenchantment and legitimacy deficit. On the one hand, they are increasingly aware of the need to regulate the world system, particularly the aspects relating to the environment and resources, financial markets and international trade as well as collective security and human rights. On the other hand, imprisoned by the nation-state mentality to which they have become wedded, political parties continue to proclaim that all the questions facing humanity as a whole are capable of being resolved within the nation-state model and during multilateral summits where necessary. But this is not the case, as was sadly proved to world opinion all too well by COP15 in Copenhagen and Rio+20.

Faced with an absence of democratic politico-institutional structures at the global (planetary) level, political parties have failed to build a coherent discourse about political power and world governance, a discourse capable of making the connection from the most local to the most global/planet-wide levels of political and public action.

The World State and world governance are therefore certainly in the unthought realm of the political.

If today's political parties based their positioning on an outline *world political system,* rather than a strictly national or international system, this would profoundly transform their discourse and political practice from the global to local levels. The coherency that they would gain in terms of their political thinking and action would also gain them legitimacy and popularity.

We should not forget that, in modern politics, ideologies have developed as part of the process whereby civil society and social movements mirror the nation states from which they emerged.

For example, the 19th nationalitarian discourse emerged mainly from movements seeking independence from empires and demanding autonomy on linguistic, ethnic or geographical

10. The exception being the very detailed contents of the Proposal Papers for a new world governance. The task now is to summarize the main ideological options (concurrent as well as opposing) whose diversity is highlighted in this series of papers.

grounds. The socialist discourse was constructed differently from country to country, especially in the context of the struggle between the trade union movement and the state from which it emerged and which it challenged.

Today, the modern world system is changing scale, encompassing all humanity. We will see how the transnational social movement (anti- and alter-globalization) is the social expression of this change of scale.

What we are missing today is a *political* discourse, or better still, several discourses in dialogue with each other, on the institutional and political structures that human society needs to exercise collective subjectivity planet-wide. The subject of ideological debate should therefore be: what type of state does the human community need?

It is, therefore, up to the planetary social movement (anti- and alter-globalization) to effectively transform itself into a democratic cosmopolitarian movement, *meaning a movement that includes the political dimension*, becoming the movement *for* a World State.

This objective may not initially appear very inspiring. However, this may well equally depend on the mobilization strategy chosen.

A self-aware cosmopolitarian movement will possibly need to declare itself a Constituent Assembly and welcome within it all the political forces, in contradiction with each other, that embrace this idea. This could be accompanied by a demand for a third form of UN, or world citizenship, as in the example of the world passport. What is important in the first instance is to popularize debate around the idea that the survival of humanity requires the creation of a legitimate world political power. There will be plenty of opportunity later on to argue over the form that this legitimate world political power would take.

Our first observation thus highlights **the first challenge**, one we might describe as epistemic (concerning knowledge).

First challenge
How can we give the transnational social movement and world governance a political dimension?

Put another way, the question could be as follows: how can we ensure that the cosmopolitarian movement concept (the movement *for* the World State) becomes an operative concept, from the *scientific* viewpoint, so that the concept

is honed and enhanced through academic debate, from the *ideological* standpoint, so that the concept is translated into political terms in discussions within political parties, and from the *social* viewpoint, so that the concept is embraced by civil society organizations that use it to defend their interests and values, as part of an evolving global social movement.

The *first proposal* is therefore to assist the main political families to *build a political discourse* on world political change, the coming World State and the democratic cosmopolitarian movement that is transmitting it, in order to implement democratic world governance.

A. Consolidate and disseminate the concept of the cosmopolitarian movement: the movement for world governance

Methods

Organize **discussions between political leaders**, *NGOs,* **social movement activists and academics in** *order to answer the following questions:*

• How can we move from a transnational/alter-globalization civil society movement to a democratic cosmopolitarian movement (hereinafter 'the movement')?

• How can we combine strengthening of the *identity of this movement*—the extent to which individuals identify with the democratic cosmopolitarian movement, and mobilization *of the resources* of organizations working for the movement (hereinafter 'the organizations')—with support for the individuals working within these organizations?

• How can we strengthen the organic and institutional ties between organizations in the movement and external political institutions?

• How can we present the work of organizations in the movement to the media, as well as the internet and social networks, to speed up consolidation of the movement?

• How can we structure the various types of social and political mobilizations run by the organizations to strengthen the movement and accelerate its consolidation within the different levels of world governance, as well as in line with different socio-political problems (common goods, migration, health, human rights, etc.)?

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B. Define the scope of a democratic cosmopolitarian movement

Methods

Based on prior work during seminars, this would involve **publishing a manifesto** *in three volumes:*

- one volume looking at the current position of *moNdernity* and *moNdernization*;

- one volume looking at the current position of social movements and the cosmopolitarian movement: *The Democratic Cosmopolitarian Movement Manifesto*;

- one volume setting out a programme of action for the democratic cosmopolitarian movement: a *What's To Be Done?* for the cosmopolitarian movement.

The manifesto will need to be accompanied by:

• a *meta-political charter for world governance*, a charter with which all parties, organizations and people working for the emergence of a World State (democratic world governance, irrespective of political ideology)can identify;

• an ethical charter governing *political engagement*

Second observation: The democratic cosmopolitarian movement (movement for world governance) does not as yet exist: the people and organizations that it comprises are not yet fully aware of it

The notion of **world governance** is heard with increasing frequency in the media, but it is never defined precisely. It is referred to mainly by leaders of international and multilateral organizations, heads of state (notably of G8 and G20 countries), representatives of international NGOs, mostly single-issue organizations (fighting debt, the WTO, climate change, etc.) as well as by some academics and the media themselves.

We accept the observation that a developing democratic cosmopolitarian movement does exist, emerging essentially at the end of the 1980s. In terms of the theory of social movements, anti- and alter-globalization can be seen as two sides of the same movement. Similarly to the nationalitarian and socialist movements that came before, the democratic cosmopolitarian movement is formed from a multitude of competing and complementary social organizations.

However, the movement is never explicitly named, and only in negative terms, with the use of anti- and alter-. Hence the importance of prioritising epistemic aspects, as laid out in the first challenge, above.

Furthermore, the movement will become a true social force once its members, both organizations and individuals, gain a shared feeling of belonging, a common identity, once individuals recognize themselves in a "we" that includes and extends beyond them, once they can say "*I identify with the democratic cosmopolitarian movement,*" the movement for world governance.

Hence the importance of using the three-volume manifesto as a rallying point.

In order to arrive at this shared sense of belonging, we must shed the idea of the *forum* (a place for debate) and move beyond the notion of *alliances* (theme-based), seeking to highlight instead the constitution of a collective subjectivity, a "being-for-itself", which better renders the idea of *movement* and gives the movement a name: the *democratic cosmopolitarian movement*, a *movement for world governance*. The movement could draw inspiration from a *forum of forums* and establish itself as an *alliance of alliances*. But the movement will not replace the forums, which must remain places for open debate, nor the alliances (particularly professional ones), which must remain platforms for ethical convergences based on shared interests and values.

The democratic cosmopolitarian movement is a meta-political movement, above contemporary parties and ideologies, as were the nationalitarian and national liberation movements before it. As its objective is the creation of a World State, it is likely to disappear at such a time as this state comes into being. Political and ideological struggles would then re-configure within this new political framework. A world parliament, similar to the European parliament, would be riven by ideological differences not so dissimilar from those we know at the local or nation-state level.

> The *second proposal* is to *construct a political movement*: the democratic cosmopolitarian movement.

The aim is to promote the creation of a world democratic cosmopolitarian movement at the five political levels of governance:

local (community-based), regional, national, continental and global (planetary).

Methods

• Found an organization that could be called *Cosmopolis: for World Governance* or the *Global Citizens' Movement* on the basis of the Democratic Cosmopolitarian Movement Manifesto.

• Give it meaning by inviting current transnational civil society actors to sign up and by distributing the manifesto (including the political and ethical charter) to:

- networks involved in the world, continental, regional and local social forums as well as the theme-based social forums;

- all actors involved in programmes run by the major foundations;

- international issue groupings (climate, anti-WTO, peasants, human rights, trade unions, women, environment, development and cooperation, etc.);

- international civil servants and diplomats at international and multilateral organizations;

- member organizations of UN ECOSOC;

- members of parliament affiliated to the Inter-Parliamentary Union;

- members of political movements and parties with an international organization (World Federalist Movement, Socialist International, Fourth International, Global Greens, etc.);

- and so on.

• Aid political movements and parties that identify with the meta-political charter for world governance and the ethical charter for political participation to:

- organize internationally;

- introduce the issues and challenges of world governance into their political programmes at the national and continental levels;

- organize meetings between representatives from these parties (party leaders, members of parliament, ministers, etc.) to share and discuss common proposals and programmes for world governance (specific and general).

3. Third observation: Transnational civil society is sector- and issue-based: this is inadequate to meet the global and systemic challenges of the modern world

From the mid-1970s until the mid-2000s, we classified under the heading of new social movements the post-1968 social movements that emerged separate from the trade union movement: feminism, human rights, the environment, eco-pacifists, anti-war, in support of refugees, illegal immigrants, for decent housing, and so on.

Once again, as for the alter- and anti-globalization movements, the descriptions for these movements are rooted in an opposition or in the negative: we say "new" social movements as a reference to, and as opposed to, the trade union movement, but without being able to accurately identify the movement.

These various mobilizations were created around specific issues. It was a succession of UN counter-summits followed by the social forums that enabled dialogue between activists from different areas of these emerging social movements.

Transnational civil society, which is constructed on a sector and issue basis, cannot currently respond to the global challenges of the modern world that it has highlighted.

The task is thus to convince those actors demanding sector-based forms of *world governance* of the necessity for *global world governance, which must be democratic*.

The third proposal has two parts:

A. convince actors demanding sector- and issue-based forms of world governance of the need to elaborate global world governance and to operate within a democratic cosmopolitarian movement; B. propose a strategy for governance of governances: the World State.

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A. Identify networks of actors with a sector or issue basis and work with them on global world governance

Methods

• *Organize* **work seminars** *between various NGO leaders and militants from social movements active in issue-based groupings, but also in the presence of international civil servants and managers from transnational corporations responsible for corporate social and environmental responsibility.*

• *Focus on the definition of humanity's common goods and their world governance. These common goods include:*

- Water

- Land

- Air

- Climate

- Mineral raw materials

- Energies

- Forests

- Mobility/migration

• As well as on cross-cutting questions surrounding world governance:

- world governance of a healthy environment (health and environment);

- world governance of peace, collective security and humanitarian action;

- world governance of integrated development (world, continental, regional and local) and trade;

- world governance of finance and currencies;

- world governance of human rights and the fight against all forms of discrimination;

- world governance of migration, the free circulation of people and the right to asylum;

- world governance of knowledge, science, education and the information and communication society;

- world governance of mass media and NICT.

• And on the principle of governance, emphasizing:

- the principle of planet-wide efficiency:

  less waste;

  efficient decision-making;

  lower costs;

- the principle of equality:

  better division of resources at the global level;

- the principle of democratic legitimacy:

  transparency of decisions;

  principle of subsidiarity;

  representation;

  participation;

  direct democracy.

B. Work on the domains that form the backbone of the emerging World State, those that already offer an institutional framework for democratic world governance: international law and UN and multilateral organizations (ILO, WTO, etc.)

• Promotion of world law:
binding international law.

- Compile a body of world law and publish it in tandem with a critical appraisal highlighting the deficiencies of the law regarding world governance.

- Strengthen world law doctrine in the academic world by encouraging a network of World Law Institutes at all major centres of learning.

- Strengthen the enforceable character of decisions taken by world tribunals: exert pressure to ensure that judgements are enforced.

• Promotion of reorganization and strengthening of international and multilateral organizations.

- Create a UN Parliament, alongside a General Assembly of States and a World Civil Society Council.

- These three chambers to elect a UN government, with the UN agencies and international organizations as ministries.

Conclusions

Every world social forum is a time for tens of thousands of activists from around the world to meet and gather strength and inspiration at the heart of the social movement.

It is this slow, continual process that has, over the past twenty years, launched the largest social movement of all time, part of a long-term process to save humanity and the planet and to build a better world. Alter-globalization seeks an alternative world. Which primarily means One World. A SINGLE World, but a "world where many worlds fit," in the words used by Subcommandante Marcos in Chiapas when he initiated the Zapatista uprising at the age of 18.

We have, over these twenty years, created A World. During these twenty years we have analyzed and assessed it, we have sketched out the ecological, economic and social alternatives.

From Rio-1992 to Rio-2012, G7 to G20, GATT to the WTO, from the enlargement of IMF special drawing rights to emerging economies to the World Social Forums counter-summits and the popularization of the idea of world governance from the WTO to the UN (especially in Geneva), the last twenty years show a very clear trend: the ambition to achieve greater legitimacy in terms of decisions taken at the global level.

Seen from Geneva, today viewed as the indisputable capital of world governance, this trend is marked.

The aim of this Proposal Paper has been to make a contribution to understanding what currently defines the emergent democratic cosmopolitarian movement, this planet-wide social movement that cries out for the constitution of a global community, or even a global society, that is plural, responsible and united: in a word, democratic.

Social Movement and World Governance
For a democratic cosmopolitarian movement

The task of demanding the move to the world level falls to national and transnational civil society. In the same way as the nationalitarian movements of the 19th century and the national liberation movements of the 20th century, the global social movement (from Porto Alegre to Rio+20) must transform itself into a world political movement: a cosmopolitarian movement demanding a world political system.

A world system capable of ensuring our planet's sustainability while encompassing social and human development, preserving biodiversity and eradicating extreme poverty.

This paper aims to demonstrate that a world community, meaning humanity imbued with the sense and desire to share a common destiny at the planetary level, cannot come about without the constitution, in whatever form, of a planetary political power: a World State.

I have thus chosen to provide a more detailed description of the global social movement I have observed as a sociologist and been part of as an activist for over twenty-five years. We are not starting from scratch. Various social processes relating to the world system process are underway, and have if anything speeded up over the course of the past twenty-five plus years. The new social movements that emerged post-1968 and the anti- and alter-globalization movements that followed have converged for the past twenty years around a set of demands for rights that have resulted in the notion being proposed of the creation of a World State, within which social and political forces would redeploy their struggles.

It is this democratic cosmopolitarian movement in the making that must demand the creation of a democratic World State.

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Geneva, 25 November 2012